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Customs, Immigration, and Rights:  
Constitutional Limits on Electronic Border Searches 
Laura K. Donohue 
abstract.  The warrantless search of travelers’ electronic devices as they enter and exit the 
United States is rapidly increasing. While the Supreme Court has long recognized a border-search 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, it applies to only two interests: pro-
moting the duty regime and preventing contraband from entering the country; and ensuring that 
individuals are legally admitted. The government’s recent use of the exception goes substantially 
beyond these matters. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) are using it to search electronic devices, and at times the cloud, for evidence of 
any criminal activity, bypassing the warrant requirement altogether. Searches of these devices im-
plicate privacy concerns well beyond those of the home, which has long been protected even for 
customs and immigration purposes. This Essay traces the evolution of the border exception, not-
ing the effect of recent Supreme Court decisions, to argue that CBP and ICE are operating outside 
constitutional constraints. The Essay considers two objections grounded in the legitimate interests 
of CBP and ICE. It responds, ﬁrst, that inspection of digital devices differs from the examination 
of a traveler’s purse or luggage: the level of intrusion and the amount of information obtained 
changes the quality of the search, triggering Fourth Amendment protections. Second, as an immi-
gration matter, as soon as citizens are identiﬁed, absent probable cause, the government does not 
have the constitutional authority to search their devices at all. Foreigners lacking a substantial con-
nection to the country, however, do not enjoy the same Fourth Amendment protections. It con-
cludes by observing that because of the substance and complexity of the issue, Congress has an 
important role to play in determining what types of searches are justiﬁed. 
introduction  
Over the past three years, the warrantless search of travelers’ electronic de-
vices as they enter and exit the country has rapidly increased. In 2015, U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP) examined 8,503 devices. That number more 
than doubled the following year, before soaring in 2017 to more than 30,000 
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searches.1 In 2015, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), in turn, 
reported the search of 4,444 cell phone and 320 other electronic devices. In 2016, 
ICE eclipsed these numbers, searching 23,000 devices.2 
The Supreme Court has long recognized a border-search exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. In United States v. Flores-Montano, 
the Court looked to the nation’s sovereign “interest in protecting . . . its territo-
rial integrity” to justify such searches.3 In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
the Court stated, somewhat more narrowly, that Congress is the source of the 
executive’s power. It explained that “[s]ince the founding of our Repub-
lic . . . [Congress has] granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct rou-
tine searches and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant.”4 
The Commerce Clause permits Congress to authorize the seizure of goods at the 
border.5 
Congress and the courts endorsed only two justiﬁcations for broad border 
search authorities: ﬁrst, “to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the 
introduction of contraband into this country;”6 and, second, to ascertain which 
 
1. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, CBP DIRECTIVE NO. 3340-049A, BORDER SEARCH 
OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/assets 
/documents/2018-Jan/CBP-Directive-3340-049A-Border-Search-of-Electronic-Media 
-Compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EA3-NEFR] [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE]; CBP Releases 
Statistics on Electronic Device Searches, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Apr. 11, 2017), 
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-statistics-electronic-
device-searches-0 [https://perma.cc/35KZ-XLEM]; CBP Releases Updated Border Search of 
Electronic Device Directive and FY17 Statistics, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Jan. 5, 
2018), https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-releases-updated 
-border-search-electronic-device-directive-and [https://perma.cc/2QHN-22YD]. 
2. Daniel Victor, What Are Your Rights if Border Agents Want to Search Your Phone?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/business/border-enforcement 
-airport-phones.html [https://perma.cc/7VHT-GPTB]. 
3. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); see also Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 
U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979) (“The authority of the United States to search the baggage of arriving 
international travelers is based on its inherent sovereign authority to protect its territorial in-
tegrity. By reason of that authority, it is entitled to require that whoever seeks entry must es-
tablish the right to enter and to bring into the country whatever he may carry.”). 
4. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). 
5. See, e.g., United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 125 (1973) 
(“[S]earches of persons and packages at the national borders rest on different considera-
tions . . . from domestic regulations. The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive 
powers ‘[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations.’ . . . Historically, such broad powers 
have been necessary to prevent smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.” (ci-
tations omitted)). 
6. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537; see also Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, repealed by 
Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 73, 2 Stat. 177; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147-51 
(1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). 
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persons should be admitted to the United States.7 For the latter, ensuring proper 
legal process (and immigration status) proved paramount.8 Looking to these ar-
eas, Congress empowered the executive to monitor “who and what may enter 
the country.”9 Congress did not provide an exception for ordinary law enforce-
ment to use the movement of people to look for evidence of criminal activity. To 
the contrary, only customs agents and immigration officials could exercise au-
thorities narrowly tailored to intercept contraband and control immigration. 
Current electronic border searches eclipse the traditional limits placed on the 
executive to justify the departure from Fourth Amendment requirements. CBP 
and ICE search devices for any criminal activity, with no limits on use of the 
material in subsequent proceedings.10 The executive branch, moreover, has tar-
geted individuals, using their movement across frontiers to obtain information 
that otherwise would require a warrant to access.11 Thus far, the courts have pro-
vided something of a backstop, chastising the executive in some of the more 
 
7. See infra Parts III and IV (tracing the purposes of broader search authorities at the border back 
to the founding of the Republic). 
8. A third area, disease prevention, also justiﬁed search powers. Such considerations are not im-
mediately relevant to the discussion regarding searches of electronic devices, although the ex-
amination of certain types of information on such devices could raise parallel concerns. For 
further discussion of the evolution of quarantine authorities, see Laura K. Donohue, Pandemic 
Disease, Biological Weapons, and War, in LAW AND WAR 84 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2014); and 
Laura K. Donohue, Biodefense and Constitutional Constraints, 4 NAT’L SEC. & ARMED CONFLICT 
L. REV. 82 (2014). 
9. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977). 
10. See, e.g., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE DIRECTIVE No. 7-6.1: BORDER 
SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES, para. 8.5(1)(a) (Aug. 18, 2009), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ice_border_search_electronic_devices.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MAP7-QL82] [hereinafter 2009 ICE DIRECTIVE] (allowing for the seizure and re-
tention of electronic devices or copies of information held on them when there is evidence of 
any “unlawful activity”); id (allowing ICE to share any information obtained “with Federal, 
state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies”); Inspection of Electronic Devices, U.S. CUS-
TOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents 
/inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5T4-FASY] [hereinafter 
Inspection of Electronic Devices] (“If CBP determines . . . the device contains evidence of a 
crime, contraband or other prohibited or restricted items of information—then you will be 
notiﬁed of the seizure.”); Policy Regarding Border Search of Information, U.S. CUSTOMS & BOR-
DER PROTECTION (July 16, 2008), https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/documents
/search_authority_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KW9-KFMN] (“[O]fficers may examine docu-
ments, books, pamphlets, and other printed material, as well as computers, disks, hard drives, 
and other electronic or digital storage devices. These examinations are part of CBP’s long-
standing practice and are essential to uncovering vital law enforcement information.”). 
11. See, e.g., Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323 (D. Mass. May 9, 2018); 
Sixth Joint Status Report, Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., No. 1:17-CV-00548-TSC (D.D.C. May 21, 2018) (summarizing FOIA litiga-
tion that revealed hundreds of complaints ﬁled by individuals whose devices were searched at 
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egregious cases.12 But in an increasingly globalized world in which citizens’ bor-
der crossings repeatedly expose them to intrusive government searches, the lack 
of Supreme Court attention and statutory law is of concern. It leaves rights at 
the mercy of each agency’s regulatory regime. As the Court recognized in Riley v. 
California, “the Founders did not ﬁght a revolution to gain the right to govern-
ment agency protocols.”13 
The rights at stake are substantial. Electronic devices “implicate privacy con-
cerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a 
purse.”14 Even the term “cell phone” is misleading, as “many of these devices are 
in fact minicomputers that also happen . . . to be used as a telephone.”15 Their 
distinguishing feature is the “immense storage capacity.”16 As the Court noted, 
“[m]ost people cannot lug around every piece of mail they have received for the 
past several months, every picture they have taken, or every book or article they 
have read.”17 With mobile devices, they can. The search of electronic devices dif-
fers from luggage searches in terms of volume as well as the type of information 
that can be obtained: medical records, location data, information regarding po-
litical beliefs or religious convictions, and details about intimate relationships—
stretching back for decades. Further, electronic devices also provide a gateway to 
digital information stored in the cloud.18 
 
the border); see also Brief of the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University 
and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs, 
Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323 (arguing that the search policies violated the First and Fourth 
Amendments). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54 (D.D.C. 2015) (rejecting a mechanical 
approach to allowing warrantless searches for digital content on cell phones). 
13. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014). 
14. Id. at 2488-89. 
15. Id. at 2489. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. This occurs in two primary ways: ﬁrst, by using the devices to access network information, 
and, second, by requiring travelers to provide identiﬁers or handles, or account login creden-
tials (such as usernames and passwords) to access social media. The latter presented in De-
cember 2016 when CBP started asking non-U.S. persons entering the country under the Visa 
Waiver Program (VWP) to disclose their social media identiﬁers. (Under the VWP, foreign 
citizens can visit the United States for up to ninety days without a visa if they have been cleared 
by the Electronic System for Travel Authorization.) Initially, the program was voluntary and 
focused on publicly-available information. In January 2017, however, the Council on Ameri-
can-Islamic Relations (CAIR) ﬁled complaints with the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, alleging that citizens were being directed to disclose not just the passwords to their 
phones, but also their social media login information. CAIR-FL Files 10 Complaints with CBP 
After the Agency Targeted and Questioned American-Muslims About Religious and Political Views, 
CAIR FLORIDA (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.cairﬂorida.org/newsroom/press-releases/720 
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A search of mobile devices compromises far more detailed and personal in-
formation than a search of an individual’s home, which traditionally has received 
the highest protections under the Fourth Amendment.19 For the latter, a warrant 
must describe with particularity what is being sought based on probable cause 
of involvement in speciﬁc crimes. Officers cannot simply cast about looking for 
any potential criminal activity. Search of an electronic device, though, allows law 
enforcement to scour countless areas of an individual’s life. It is the equivalent of 
looking not just at an individual’s home, but entering their bank, their car, and 
their workplace; accompanying them on dates and on social occasions; going to 
the PTA meeting with them, or to their local grocery store or mall; attending 
their places of worship; and sitting down next to them at the public library to 
make a record of everything they read. 
Home warrants also are particularized in their execution against named in-
dividuals. In contrast, the search of an electronic device uncovers lots of data 
about extended family, friends, and acquaintances. Metadata pinpoints them at 
certain places at particular times. Otherwise password-protected social media 
 
-cair-ﬂ-ﬁles-10-complaints-with-cbp-after-the-agency-targeted-and-questioned-american 
-muslims-about-religious-and-political-views.html [https://perma.cc/5BZZ-9KTA]; see also 
Sophia Cope, Fear Materialized: Border Agents Demand Social Media Data from Americans, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/01/fear-ma-
terialized-border-agents-demand-social-media-data-americans [https://perma.cc/SYT2 
-6Z8N] (criticizing the CBP’s social media policy). Media reported that officials were consid-
ering new policies to expand CBP scrutiny of cloud content. In February 2017, newly-ap-
pointed DHS Secretary John Kelly told a congressional committee that the agency might 
adopt a provision requiring login information from all foreign visa applicants, with failure to 
comply resulting in denial of entry. Starting in May 2017, login information became required 
in cases tied to national security. Less than a year later, in March 2018, the U.S. Department 
of State submitted a formal proposal to the Office of Management and Budget, requiring that 
almost all visa applicants list all social media identities used over the previous ﬁve years, all 
telephone numbers, all email addresses, all international travel, all prior immigration viola-
tions, and whether speciﬁed family members have been involved in terrorist activity. 60-Day 
Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Application for Nonimmigrant Visa, 83 Fed. Reg. 
13807 (proposed Mar. 30, 2018). The rule change would allow the government to vet and 
identify about 14.7 million people per year, searching any social media platforms associated 
with the individual. Matthew Lee, U.S. to Seek Social Media Details from All Visa Applicants, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-29/us-to-
seek-social-media-details-from-all-visa-applicants; Brendan O’Brien, U.S. Visa Applicants to 
Be Asked for Social Media History: State Department, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-visa/u-s-visa-applicants-to-be-asked
-for-social-media-history-state-department-idUSKBN1H611P [https://perma.cc/HSE5 
-ZWDR]. 
19. Since before the Founding, outside the ﬂeeing felon and the hue and cry, a particularized war-
rant has been required to access the home. See Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amend-
ment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181 (2016). 
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accounts reveal what they know and believe, what they ﬁnd amusing—or upset-
ting, and what their political views may be. Intimate thoughts, conveyed 
through email, remain even after users delete messages. Access to all of this 
stretches, potentially, years backwards in time. 
As a substantive matter, what is present in a house or apartment is more lim-
ited than what can be obtained from the search of a mobile phone or computer. 
Inside the home, business records are far less likely to be found than at work. 
Financial data is bounded by time and records retention. Correspondence, at 
best, will be incomplete, and photographs generally will be only those that have 
been printed. In comparison, one phone may contain and provide access to all of 
an individual’s work documents (as well as some of their colleagues’), complete 
ﬁnancial records, extensive correspondence, and every photo ever taken. From 
this, the number and quality of an individual’s intimate relationships can be dis-
covered, and the strength of an individual’s social networks ascertained. Inside 
the home, there may only be traces of where an individual has gone outside the 
home (perhaps because of a souvenir here or there). On the phone, however, this 
information may be stored in map applications, address books, photograph and 
video metadata, and GPS records. A private library does not contain every book 
an individual has read. Electronic devices, in contrast, capture all digital print 
books, audio books, and internet-based materials an individual has read, as well 
as movies they have watched, jokes at which they’ve laughed, and statements 
made on social media with which they agree. This is far more information than 
law enforcement would be able to obtain by executing a physical warrant. By 
accessing a phone, moreover, if certain applications have been downloaded, law 
enforcement could gain access not just to the digital world, but also to the inside 
of the home itself.20 
This Essay argues that the electronic searches CBP and ICE are conducting 
at ports of entry violate the Fourth Amendment. It documents the well-estab-
lished, historical limitations on border searches that have served to justify the 
exception, and demonstrates how current practices fall well outside constitu-
tional protections.21 It begins with the current CBP and ICE regulations that 
 
20. For instance, Blink Home Monitor, an application that can be downloaded to smartphones 
and tablets, provides homeowners with real-time coverage of what is happening inside their 
houses. If CBP or ICE were to search a mobile device and open the application, they could 
(virtually) enter someone’s home as they cross the border. See Blink Home Monitor Smartphone 
and Tablet Apps, BLINK, https://blinkforhome.com/pages/blink-home-monitor-app?locale=
en [https://perma.cc/L2VL-ZCNA]. 
21. While this Essay focuses on the Fourth Amendment, the rights of free speech, free association, 
and freedom of religion are also implicated by border searches. These rights “are protected 
not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stiﬂed by more subtle gov-
ernmental interference.” Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); see also Memo-
randum and Order, Alasaad v. Nielsen, No. 17-CV-11730-DJC, 2018 WL 2170323, at *22 (D. 
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govern the search of travelers’ devices before laying out the history of customs 
border search authorities, observing that the primary purpose of these measures 
is and has always been to interdict contraband and to prevent uncustomed goods 
from entering the country. These limited aims, which relate to sovereignty, form 
the core justiﬁcation behind the border search exception. Here, strong protec-
tions have been extended to the home, even where contraband may be at issue. 
 
Mass. May 9, 2018). Compulsory “disclosure of political affiliations and activities can impose 
just as substantial a burden on First Amendment rights as can direct regulation.” AFL-CIO v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 333 F.3d 168, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also Memorandum and Order, 
Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *22. Therefore, “[w]hen a State seeks to inquire about an indi-
vidual’s beliefs and associations a heavy burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is neces-
sary to protect a legitimate state interest.” Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971); 
see also Memorandum and Order, Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *22. Electronic media, in par-
ticular, falls within First Amendment protections. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 
1730, 1735 (2017). Justice Kennedy observed: “[w]hile in the past there may have been diffi-
culty in identifying the most important places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views, 
today the answer is clear . . . [i]t is cyberspace – the ‘vast democratic forums of the internet’ 
in general, and social media in particular.” 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844 (1997)). He added, “[social media] websites can provide perhaps the most powerful 
mechanisms available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.” Id. The implications 
of access to electronic devices for religious freedom, free speech, and free association are sub-
stantial. Information contained in mobile phones, tablets, and computers implicates the most 
intimate aspects of a person’s politics, beliefs, and relationships. In Alasaad v. Nielsen, the court 
has acknowledged the strength of the First Amendment claims. Litigants in that case (on be-
half of eleven travelers) seek an injunction against DHS, CBP, and ICE and the expungement 
of private information that was obtained in multiple prior warrantless electronic border 
searches. Memorandum and Order, Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *10-16. The government’s 
initial effort to have the case dismissed on Fourth and First Amendment grounds failed. Id. 
As a matter of Fourth Amendment law, the district court “concluded that Riley has some 
weight in the border search context,” thus establishing “a plausible Fourth Amendment 
claim.” Id. at *21; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, 
Alasaad, 2017 WL 6998925, at *15-27 (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2017). Although the district court in 
Alasaad did not agree with the plaintiffs that strict scrutiny was warranted (on the grounds 
that CBP and ICE policies are content-neutral), it recognized that compelled disclosure “can-
not be justiﬁed by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest.” Memorandum 
and Order, Alasaad, 2018 WL 2170323, at *22 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). 
First Amendment doctrine requires a “substantial relation between the governmental interest 
and the information required to be disclosed.” Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64-65). The 
court noted that the plaintiffs had argued that in light of the immense storage capacity of both 
electronic devices and the cloud, the regulations “impose a substantial burden on First 
Amendment rights without justiﬁcation.” Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Instead of countering the plaintiffs’ claim, the government had merely stated that a First 
Amendment exception to border search doctrine would be “staggering.” Id. at *23 (quoting 
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005)). The court rejected the government’s 
assumption that all expressive material would thereby be excluded, suggesting that the plain-
tiffs had raised a plausible claim that the current policies “unjustiﬁably burden travelers’ First 
Amendment rights.” Id. 
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The Essay then turns to the evolution of immigration law, pointing out that 
the historical purpose of such measures has been (a) to establish identity, (b) to 
admit “desirable” aliens, and (c) to exclude others, subject to policies set by Con-
gress. The only reason the border search exception applies at all is to permit Con-
gress to achieve these objectives. Even then, the powers of search and seizure are 
subject to higher protections at the threshold of the home. 
The Essay next focuses on Fourth Amendment doctrine, looking at how the 
circuit courts have come down on the question of electronic border searches be-
fore and after a string of recent Supreme Court cases challenging traditional doc-
trine: Riley,22 United States v. Jones,23 and Carpenter v. United States.24 Applying 
the two-part approach articulated by Chief Justice Roberts in Carpenter, which 
focused on the nature of the documents being sought and limitations on any 
legitimate expectations of privacy regarding the contents, this Part recognizes 
that the border search exception does not apply to electronic devices in the same 
way it does to the search of a traveler’s other belongings.25 
The government considers its current practices constitutional in light of the 
status of electronic data as a form of “digital contraband”.26 The Essay responds 
with two arguments. First, just as bits and bytes constitute the functional equiv-
alent of illegal material, so, too, does the search that is being undertaken repre-
sent the functional equivalent of the search of the home, and, potentially, every 
aspect of an individual’s life. For the same reasons that the Court in Riley rejected 
the search of electronic devices within U.S. borders, examination of the same at 
ports of entry constitutes precisely the type of search covered by the Fourth 
Amendment and, historically protected even in the context of customs and duties. 
Second, to the extent that one could argue that criminals could take advantage 
of such a rule to upload material to the cloud, cross the border, and then down-
load it within the U.S. (thereby avoiding detection), in-person physical transit 
has never been a necessary to bring contraband into the United States. Where 
sent through the post, Fourth Amendment protections still apply. Additionally, 
in a digital world, it is not only as a traveler crosses the border that the govern-
ment has an opportunity to intercept material. Electronic search provisions, re-
cent changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and foreign intelligence 
 
22. 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
23. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
24. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
25. Id. at 2218-20 (addressing (a) the nature of the documents being sought; and (b) limitations 
on any legitimate expectations of privacy in the information). 
26. See, e.g., Government’s Opening Brief at 49, United States v. Arnold, 2007 WL 1407234 (9th 
Cir. Mar. 29, 2007) (No. 06-50581) (“The court’s decision therefore poses a serious risk of 
affirmatively increasing the use of computers as a sanctuary for digital contraband and other 
harmful materials.”). 
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authorities allow the government to identify illegal activities, conduct investiga-
tions, and access digital materials. At the border, a gradated search that distin-
guishes between reasonable suspicion for a basic (manual) search and probable 
cause for an advanced, forensic search would recognize that some level of suspi-
cion is required at the outset to search devices, and that such searches ought not 
to be granted in toto, but should take place under narrowly-circumscribed limits 
absent the stronger showing of probable cause. Where such matters enter the 
domain of matters ordinarily encased in the home, the Fourth Amendment es-
tablishes more stringent protections. 
The Essay also addresses the primary counterargument regarding immigra-
tion measures: that it is the role of immigration authorities to identify and to 
inquire into the type of person admitted to the United States. In response, it 
notes that U.S. persons, as soon as their identity as citizen or legal resident is 
established, are no longer subject to immigration search authorities. Thus, no 
search of U.S. persons’ electronic devices is justiﬁed under the immigration excep-
tion. For non-U.S. persons, who lack a substantial relationship to the United 
States, CPB and ICE have broader authority. One of the starkest examples of 
how the current regulations fail to provide adequate protections is in the realm 
of electronic communications, where, despite the use of passwords and encryp-
tion, travelers are denied the same privacies that would be extended to the same 
material if it were physically written on paper. The Essay concludes by reiterating 
the concern that current practices violate constitutional norms, acknowledging 
that once a traveler establishes their citizenship, their electronic devices can only 
be searched consistent with the Fourth Amendment probable cause and warrant 
requirements, and proposing a stronger role for Congress in developing a statu-
tory regime for noncitizens seeking entry. 
i .  current regulatory regime  
The rights at issue in the government’s search of electronic devices at the 
border are substantial. Even so, these searches are governed by agency regula-
tions that do not account for the importance of the interests at stake. This Part 
brieﬂy describes the existing regime. 
CBP’s January 2018 guidelines allow for “basic” searches without suspicion.27 
This means that the agency considers itself entitled to seize the mobile phones, 
 
27. See CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 
required CBP to establish “standard operating procedures for searching, reviewing, retaining, 
and sharing information contained in communication, electronic, or digital devices encoun-
tered . . . [at] ports of entry.” Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-125, § 802(a), 130 Stat. 122, 205 (codiﬁed at 6 U.S.C. § 211(k)(1)(A) (2018)). The 
statute requires CBP to update its procedures every three years. 
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tablets, and laptops of every U.S. citizen—including those of judges, Justices, 
and Members of Congress, and their colleagues, families and friends—without 
any suspicion of wrongdoing. With one exception, there are no statutory, 
regulatory, or, according to the agencies, constitutional limits on who can see 
this information, how long it can be kept, or how it can be used.28 For attorney-
client-privileged material, or attorney work product, a “ﬁlter team” segregates 
protected material.29 There are no special protections provided for journalists, 
sensitive political material, trade secrets, medical information, or materials 
otherwise privileged at law. Information obtained from these searches can be 
shared with any federal, state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency.30 For 
“advanced” forensic searches, which involve connecting external equipment “to 
an electronic device not merely to gain access . . . but to review, copy, and/or 
analyze its contents,” 31  customs officers must merely meet a standard of 
“reasonable suspicion of activity in violation of the laws enforced or administered 
by CBP, or in which there is a national security concern.”32 
In December 2018, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General 
released a report on CBP’s border searches, ﬁnding that the agency had violated 
its own guidelines by failing to limit its collection of electronic data and to delete 
information obtained.33 The problem was widespread: sixty-seven percent of 
the Electronic Media Reports examined contained inconsistencies.34 Officials 
 
28. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1467 (2018) (empowering customs officers to inspect, examine, and 
search persons, baggage, and merchandise without limiting subsequent use of what is discov-
ered); 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2018) (empowering officials to examine, inspect, and search ves-
sels or vehicles without restriction on subsequent use); 19 U.S.C. § 1582 (2018) (empowering 
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations for searching persons and baggage); see also 
19 U.S.C. § 1496 (2018) (empowering customs officers to examine the baggage of any person 
arriving in the United States); 19 U.S.C. § 1499 (2018) (specifying procedures for the inspec-
tion, appraisement, and examination of imported merchandise). 
29. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1, at 10 para. 5.2.1.2. 
30. Id. at 10 para. 5.5.1.3. 
31. Id. at 5 para. 5.1.4. 
32. Id. Critics raise concern that manual searches can be just as intrusive as forensic searches, with 
the implication that the type of information at stake (all emails, text messages, contacts, pho-
tos, calendar items, browsing histories, and the like) meets the threshold for a warrant re-
quirement. See, e.g., Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, New CBP Border Device Search Policy Still 
Permits Unconstitutional Searches, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www
.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/01/new-cbp-border-device-search-policy-still-permits 
-unconstitutional-searches [https://perma.cc/RW5Y-HT5P]. They also note that at the bor-
der, “national security” can be broadly construed, proving an exception to the rule. Id. 
33. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., CBP’S SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC 
DEVICES AT PORTS OF ENTRY – REDACTED 5, 8-9 (2018), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites 
/default/ﬁles/assets/2018-12/OIG-19-10-Nov18.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2FN-SUWX]. 
34. Id. at 6. 
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had consistently failed, for instance, to disable data connections to networks 
prior to search of the devices; other information was simply copied onto thumb 
drives and kept.35 Although the 2018 Privacy Impact Assessment for CBP Border 
Searches of Electronic Devices stated that the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) should audit the agency’s collection of personally-identiﬁable 
information, nothing has yet been made publicly available.36 
The equivalent 2009 ICE directive has not been updated since the last review 
in 2012.37 Like its CBP counterpart, the mandate applies to any item containing 
electronic or digital information.38 However, there are three critical differences 
which, as a formal matter, empower ICE to conduct even more intrusive 
searches. First, the document authorizes ICE Special Agents to “search, detain, 
seize, retain, and share electronic devices, or information contained therein, with 
or without individualized suspicion.”39 In the course of the search, the policy 
explicitly protects agents’ authority “to make written notes or reports or to 
document impressions relating to a border encounter in ICE’s paper or electronic 
recordkeeping systems.”40 Second, there is no heightened standard imposed for 
forensic searches. Instead, “[a]t any point during a border search, electronic 
devices, or copies of information therefrom, may be detained for further review 
either on-site at the place of detention or at an off-site location.”41 Searches can 
take place up to thirty days after the information is seized, with continuations 
subject to supervisory approval every ﬁfteen days thereafter.42  Third, unlike 
 
35. Id. 
36. See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., DHS/CBP/PIA-008(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UP-
DATE FOR CBP BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES 20 (2018), https://www.dhs.gov
/sites/default/ﬁles/publications/privacy-pia-cbp008-bordersearcheselectronicdevices 
-january2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJK9-V657]; see also Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 
6, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, No. 1:19-
cv-00279 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2019), https://epic.org/foia/cbp/border-device-search-audits
/Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/FKU4-CZKT]. 
37. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 10. 
38. Compare id. at 2 para. 5.2 (“Any item that may contain information, such as computers, disks, 
drives, tapes, mobile phones and other communication devices, cameras, music players, and 
any other electronic or digital devices.”), with CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1, at 2 para. 3.2 (“Any 
device that may contain information in an electronic or digital form, such as computers, tab-
lets, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other communication devices, cameras, music 
and other media players.”). 
39. 2009 ICE Directive, supra note 10, at 2 para. 6.1. 
40. Id. at 2 para. 6.3. 
41. Id. at 4 para. 8.1.4. 
42. Id. at 5 para. 8.3.1. 
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CBP, which (ostensibly) only performs basic searches in the equivalent of 
“airplane mode,” ICE can access information held on the cloud.43 
The disjunction between CBP and ICE to some extent reﬂects their 
respective streams of authority: customs and immigration. The former 
emphasizes ﬁnding contraband, while the latter focuses on the character of 
individuals entering the country—partially explaining ICE’s broader search 
powers in regard to online information and data stored on the cloud. Regardless, 
both agencies’ actions are merging into the realm of traditional law enforcement, 
raising troubling constitutional concerns. 
i i .  customs border search authorities  
Historically, the executive branch had latitude to conduct searches at the 
border without ﬁrst establishing probable cause and obtaining a warrant. The 
breadth of that authority derived in part from the evolution of customs law. 
During the early colonial period, England understood customs searches as 
necessary in the context of commercial regulation, as customs provided an 
opportunity to ensure dominance in shipping and trade. Over time, the 
emphasis shifted to using customs to generate revenue. Officials thus obtained 
broad powers to search for, and to interdict, “uncustomed” materials. Following 
the American Revolution, the latter emphasis survived, laying the groundwork 
for today’s CBP authorities. This history matters: it demonstrates that the 
purpose of customs search authority is to generate revenue and to interdict 
contraband. Where such searches moved away from the border and entered onto 
private property, special protections applied. Both aspects—the purpose of the 
search and the restrictions applied in relation to the home—serve as a limit on 
the border search exception. 
A. Colonial History: Commercial Regulation Versus Revenue Generation 
England saw in the American colonies an opportunity to consolidate its 
dominance in global shipping and trade. Accordingly, the customs laws applied 
to the colonies initially focused on goods shipped to and from the Americas, 
requiring, ﬁrst, that they be brought to England and, later, carried exclusively on 
English vessels. 
As early as 1621, the Privy Council recognized the ﬁnancial and commercial 
opportunities at stake, arguing that “the Commodities brought from” the colony 
of Virginia ought to be “appropriated unto his Majesties subjectes” instead of 
 
43. Compare id. at 2 para. 6.1, with CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 1, at 4 para. 5.1.2 (“Officers may not 
intentionally use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely.”). 
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being “communicated to forraine countries.”44 The council accordingly adopted 
an ordinance requiring that “all Tobacco and other commodities” from Virginia 
shall “not be carried into any forraine partes until the same have beene ﬁrst 
landed here and his Majesties Customes paid therefore.”45 In the ﬁrst Navigation 
Act of 1651, Parliament went on to require that any materials to or from the 
Americas be carried on English ships. 46  The goal was to prevent European 
powers from trading directly with the colonies. 
Following the Stuart Restoration, in 1660 Parliament passed the second 
Navigation Act, re-entrenching the rule that colonial trade be carried out only 
on English vessels. The vessels had to be English-owned, operated by an English 
master, and carry a crew of which three-quarters must be English.47 The statute 
did not prevent foreign imports to the colonies—it merely required transport 
under the English ﬂag. Three years later, Parliament tightened its grip with the 
third Navigation Act, requiring that any European commodities bound for the 
colonies ﬁrst be taken to England, unloaded, and duties paid, prior to their 
return to North America.48 The goal was to establish a monopoly over colonial 
trade. 
Over time, English statutes applied to the colonies shifted their focus from 
commercial regulation to revenue generation. The early navigation statutes 
erroneously assumed that most or all colonial trade involved overseas 
commerce.49 In the absence of regulation, intracolonial trade (not subject to 
duties) began to ﬂourish, with commodities eventually making their way to 
Europe “to the great hurt and diminution of the Customs and of the trade.”50 
Parliament closed this gap in the Navigation Act of 1673, requiring that a bond 
be paid on enumerated items where the ship travelled between plantations.51 
The enforcement devices, though, were weak. They also differed from those in 
place in England: in the late seventeenth century, customs agents could search 
 
44. THOMAS C. BARROW, TRADE AND EMPIRE: THE BRITISH CUSTOMS SERVICE IN COLONIAL AMER-
ICA 1660-1775, at 4 (1999). 
45. Id. 
46. An Act for Increase of Shipping, and Encouragement of the Navigation of this Nation, (1651), 
2 ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM, 1642-1660, at 559 (C.H. Firth & R.S. Rait eds., 1911). 
47. Navigation Act 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18 (Eng.). 
48. Navigation Act 1663, 15 Car. 2 c. 7 (Eng.). 
49. BARROW, supra note 44, at 6. 
50. Entry Book: Miscellaneous Years, 1689-92, 9 CALENDAR TREASURY BOOKS 1960, 1965 (William 
A. Shaw ed., 1931), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/search/series 
/cal-treasury-books [https://perma.cc/FAG5-A6KQ] [hereinafter C.T.B.]. 
51. Navigation Act 1673, 25 Car. 2 c. 7 (Eng.). 
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“any ship, house, or place soever” in London to search for prohibited goods.52 
The Treasurer could provide a warrant to the customs commissions to examine 
trunks and boxes held at the Custom House in Southampton.53 There was no 
colonial equivalent. 
Accordingly, in the eighteenth century, Britain assumed greater powers to 
search for, and to seize, colonial contraband.54 Lord Grenville, the First Lord of 
the Treasury, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, famously considered the colonies 
to be the best source of revenue, charging the colonies with a failure to offset the 
costs of their own defense.55 He repeatedly argued in Westminster for more 
stringent customs enforcement in North America. Many agreed, so when the 
Molasses Act expired, Parliament passed a measure that emphasized 
mercantilism and revenue generation. The preamble to the American Revenue 
Act of 1764, otherwise known as the Sugar Act, explained: “[I]t is expedient that 
new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue 
of this kingdom, and for extending and securing the navigation and commerce 
between Great Britain and your Majesty’s dominions in America.”56 This statute, 
along with the Currency Act of 176457 (in which Britain assumed control of the 
colonial system of currency), laid the groundwork for the revolt that followed 
the introduction of the Stamp Act of 1765.58 
B. Contraband in the Early American Republic 
Following independence, when the United States found itself in need of 
revenue to pay for the war, customs inspectors continued to have broad search 
authorities. The ﬂedgling country needed efficient customs enforcement 
mechanisms. Contraband meant a loss of revenues. Thus, from the earliest days 
 
52. Compare Entry Book: October 1663, in 1 C.T.B., supra note 50, at 547, 550, with Entry Book: De-
cember 1661, in 1 C.T.B., supra note 50, at 311, 315 (directing John Seymour and Charles Smith 
“to search for all wares and merchandize mentioned in the royal proclamation of November 
20 last for prohibiting the importation of divers foreign wares and merchandizes into this 
realm of England and Wales”). 
53. Entry Book: April 1661, in 1 C.T.B., supra note 50, at 232, 238. 
54. See generally GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN STATE (Edward Gray et al. eds., 2016). 
55. Philip Lawson, George Grenville and America: The Years of Opposition, 1765 to 1770, 37 WM. & 
MARY Q. 561, 568 (1980). 
56. The Sugar Act 1764, 4 Geo 3 c.15 (Gr. Brit.). See FRED ANDERSON, The American Duties Act 
(The Sugar Act), in CRUCIBLE OF WAR: THE SEVEN YEARS’ WAR AND THE FATE OF EMPIRE IN 
BRITISH NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1766, at 572 (2000). 
57. Currency Act 1764, 4 Geo. III c. 34 (Eng.). 
58. Duties in American Colonies Act 1765, 5 Geo. III c. 12 (Eng.). 
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of the Republic, customs inspectors could board vessels to search for contraband 
without ﬁrst obtaining a warrant. To ﬁnd the same items within a dwelling 
house, building, or other place, though, customs officers ﬁrst had to obtain a 
warrant based upon “cause to suspect.”59 
In 1789, the same year that Congress forwarded the Bill of Rights to the 
states for ratiﬁcation, it enacted statutes setting duties, establishing international 
ports of entry, requiring vessels to report their contents, and providing for 
inspectors to board vessels to examine whether the stated goods comported with 
the items on board.60 Under the Act of July 31, 1789, officials could board any 
vessel “in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or 
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, 
and secure any such goods, wares or merchandise.”61 The statute drew a line at 
the threshold of the home: where agents suspected that such materials were 
concealed in a “dwelling house, store, building, or other place,” they could apply 
to a justice of the peace for a warrant to conduct a search for the goods, “and if 
any shall be found, to seize and secure the same for trial.”62 Congress passed 
 
59. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). 
60. An Act for laying a Duty on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises imported into the United States, 
ch. 2, §§ 1, 3, 4, 1 Stat. 24, 24-27 (1789) (setting duties); An Act to regulate the Collection of 
the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and mer-
chandises imported into the United States, Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5. § 1, 1 Stat. 29, 29 (estab-
lishing districts, ports, and officers); id. § 2 (establishing ports for non-U.S. vessels); id. § 4 
(requiring the master or commander of every ship or vessel to provide “a true manifest of the 
cargo on board such ship or vessel”); id. § 5 (empowering the inspectors of vessels “to exam-
ine whether the goods imported are conformable to the entries thereof”); id. § 10 (requiring 
that the master or commander of the vessel to provide the manifest to the inspector with “a 
true account of the loading which such ship or vessel had on board at the port from which she 
last sailed, and at the time of her sailing, or at any time since, the packages, marks and num-
bers, and noting thereon to what port in the United States such ship or vessel is bound, and 
the name or names of the person or persons to whom the goods are consigned, or in cases 
where the goods are shipped to order, the names of the shippers”); id. § 12 (prohibiting any 
goods, wares, or merchandise from being unladen or delivered from any ship or vessel at night 
or without a permit from the collector); An Act for Registering and Clearing Vessels, Regu-
lating the Coasting Trade, and for other purposes, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 55, 55-56 (1789) (empow-
ering the surveyor to measure every vessel to ascertain its tonnage); An Act to suspend part 
of an Act, intituled ‘An Act to regulate the collection of the Duties imposed by Law on the 
Tonnage of Ships or Vessels, and on Goods, Wares, and Merchandises, imported into the 
United States,’ and for other purposes, ch. 15, § 3, 1 Stat. 69, 69-70 (1789) (setting duties on 
certain foreign goods). 
61. An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the tonnage of ships or 
vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the United States, ch. 5, § 24, 1 
Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (codiﬁed at 19 U.S.C § 482 (2018)). 
62. Id. 
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additional statutes in 1790, 1793, and 1799, all of which underscored the 
importance of the enforcement of duties.63 
Contemporaneous with the drafting and adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment, the First, Second, and Fourth Congresses signaled that there was 
no need to obtain a warrant for goods subject to forfeiture when held in a ship 
or vessel. The amendment did not include any exceptions in the text, but the 
“right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable search and seizure” applied to domestic matters—not to 
goods crossing the border. 64  Once such goods, however, were held in a 
warehouse, building, or dwelling within the United States, the law required that 
customs agents obtain a warrant before conducting a search. 
Vehicles and goods in transit presented a particular conundrum, which 
Congress addressed in the Act of July 18, 1866.65 That statute made it lawful for 
any customs officer “to go on board of any vessel, as well without as within his 
district, and to inspect, search, and examine the same, and any person, trunk, or 
envelope on board, and to this end, to hail and stop such vessel if under way, and 
to use all necessary force to compel compliance.”66 The customs officer had the 
authority to seize the items where it appeared “that any breach or violation of the 
laws of the United States [had] been committed” whereby “such vessel, or the 
goods, wares, and merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by 
such vessel, is or are liable to forfeiture.”67 This provision paralleled the ﬂeeing-
felon exception: the government did not need to ﬁrst approach a third party 
magistrate for a warrant. The logic was that a crime was underway. In the latter 
context, it was the commission of a felony, and in the former context, the failure 
to pay duties at the border. Pari passu, the statute empowered officers to “arrest 
any person engaged in such breach or violation” and to pursue and arrest anyone 
 
63. See An Act to provide more effectually for the collection of the duties imposed by law on goods, 
wares and merchandise imported into the United States, and on the tonnage of ships or ves-
sels, ch. 35, §§ 48-51, 1 Stat. 145, 170 (1790); An Act for enrolling and licensing ships or vessels 
to be employed in the coasting trade and ﬁsheries, and for regulating the same, ch. 8, § 27, 1 
Stat. 305, 315 (1793); An Act altering the time of holding the District Court in Vermont, ch. 
22, §§ 68-71, 1 Stat. 627, 677 (1799); see also An Act further to regulate the entry of merchan-
dise imported into the United States from any adjacent territory, ch. 14, 3 Stat. 616 (1821); 
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985) (“Since the founding of our 
Republic, Congress has granted the Executive plenary authority to conduct routine searches 
and seizures at the border, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the col-
lection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country.”). 
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
65. An Act further to prevent Smuggling and for other Purposes, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178 (1866). 
66. Id. § 2. 
67. Id. 
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who tried to escape.68 Speciﬁcally, officers could stop, search, and examine “any 
vehicle, beast, or person on which or whom he . . . shall suspect there are goods, 
wares, or merchandise which are subject to duty or shall have been introduced 
into the United States in any matter contrary to law.”69 The statute reﬂected the 
importance of securing things to prevent the illegal movement of uncustomed 
goods—namely, the vehicle, animals, “goods, wares, or merchandise, and all 
other appurtenances, including trunks, envelopes, covers, and all means of 
concealment, and all the equipage, trappings, or other appurtenances of such 
beast.”70 
C. Contemporary Border Search Authorities 
In 1930, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act increased tariffs on agricultural and 
industrial goods.71  Eight years later, an amendment to the act provided for 
special inspection, examination, and search authorities. 72  As subsequently 
amended, the law empowers customs officers, acting pursuant to regulations 
issued by the Secretary of the Treasury or the Customs Service, to “enforce, cause 
inspection, examination, and search to be made of the persons, baggage, and 
merchandise discharged or unladen from” vessels arriving at U.S. ports, 
regardless of whether the goods have previously undergone inspection.73 
In carrying out their duties, customs officers may board any vessel or vehicle 
“without as well as within [their] district[s],” in order to “examine the manifest 
and other documents and papers” and “examine, inspect, and search the vessel 
or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on 
board.”74 Customs officers “may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. § 3. 
70. Id. 
71. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590 (codiﬁed as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1683g 
(2018)); see also Robert Whaples, Where Is There Consensus Among American Economic Histo-
rians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 139, 151 (1995) (ﬁnding 
consensus among economic historians that the Act “exacerbated the Great Depression”). 
72. Customs Administrative Act of 1938, ch. 679, 52 Stat. 1077, 1083 (codiﬁed as amended at 19 
U.S.C. § 1467 (2018)). 
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1467; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1496 (“The appropriate customs officer may cause an 
examination to be made of the baggage of any person arriving in the United States in order 
to ascertain what articles are contained therein and whether subject to duty, free of duty, or 
prohibited notwithstanding a declaration and entry therefor has been made.”); 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1499 (providing for entry examination of imported merchandise). 
74. 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a). 
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necessary force to compel compliance.” 75  The Treasury Secretary has the 
authority to issue regulations for searching persons and baggage.76 Further, “all 
persons coming into the United States from foreign countries shall be liable to 
detention and search by authorized officers or agents of the Government under 
such regulations.”77 
As a matter of case law, the level of suspicion required to search travelers for 
illegal goods as they cross the border increases as the search becomes more 
intrusive. Courts, for instance, do not require particularized suspicion for the 
contents of a traveler’s briefcase, luggage, purse, or pockets.78 Nor is it required 
for documents within containers inside such items.79 Pictures, ﬁlms, and other 
graphic materials do not earn any higher level of protection.80 Minimal suspicion 
is sufficient to warrant a pat-down.81 In comparison, the search of a travelers’ 
undergarments and strip searches require “real suspicion.”82 The only context 
thus far recognized by the Supreme Court as requiring individualized suspicion 
is related to the intimate physical search of a woman believed to be smuggling 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. § 1582. The implementing regulations for the statutes can be found at 19 C.F.R. § 162.21 
(2018). 
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1582; see also Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 582, 46 Stat. 590, 748 (enacting § 1582). 
78. See, e.g., United States v. Tsai, 282 F.3d 690, 696 (9th Cir. 2002); Henderson v. United States, 
390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1967). But note that suspicion as a basis for detention and ques-
tioning cannot be based merely on ancestry. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 886-87 (1975). 
79. See United States v. Grayson, 597 F.2d 1225, 1228-29 (9th Cir. 1979). 
80. Cf. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (holding that the 
seizure of obscene photographs at a port of entry was not unconstitutional, for “[c]ustoms 
officers characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so is not questioned in this 
case; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the 
country”). 
81. Guam v. Sugiyama, 846 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1988) (ﬁnding a pat-down to be appropriate 
when the suspect was known to be connected to packages of marijuana previously sent to the 
airport); accord United States v. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d 499, 504-05 (9th Cir. 1984), vacated in 
part, 772 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1985) (ﬁnding a pat-down was justiﬁed when objects frequently 
used in narcotics smuggling were found in the traveler’s suitcase); United States v. Quintero-
Castro, 705 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1983) (ﬁnding a pat-down to be appropriate where 
the traveler paid cash for the ticket, appeared nervous, and the traveler’s story conﬂicted with 
a co-traveler’s story); United States v. Carter, 563 F.2d 1360, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1977) (ﬁnding 
a pat-down to be appropriate when the traveler appeared nervous and did not directly answer 
questions about the trip); United States v. Rivera-Marquez, 519 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(ﬁnding a pat-down to be appropriate when an informant told agents that an individual with 
the traveler’s name would be smuggling drugs on that day). 
82. Des Jardins, 747 F.2d at 505; United States v. Couch, 688 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970). 
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drugs in her alimentary canal.83 In the 1985 case United States v. Montoya de 
Hernandez, customs officials suspected that a woman had swallowed balloons 
containing drugs.84 The Supreme Court determined that reasonable suspicion 
was required to detain the individual until the drugs had passed.85 This decision 
followed a series of lower court cases rejecting mere suspicion for intrusive body 
searches, requiring a “clear indication” or “plain suggestion” of criminal 
activity.86 
Vehicle searches are subject to a less rigorous standard than are searches of 
persons. In United States v. Flores-Montano, reasonable suspicion was not 
considered necessary for removing a gas tank to search for contraband.87 The 
Supreme Court, however, has held open the possibility “that some searches 
of property are so destructive as to require” particularized suspicion.88 
D. Mail Search 
The discussion above addresses goods and materials crossing U.S. borders. 
Special laws address the search of items sent through the postal system, where 
stronger protections are afforded to citizens’ communications. These measures 
sharply contrast with the lack of restrictions over CBP’s current search of 
electronic mail—the modern-day equivalent of the post. 
 
83. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985). 
84. Id. at 534. 
85. Id. at 541. 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Vance, 62 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding “real suspicion” was 
present when the defendant, traveling from Hawaii to Guam, underwent a pat-down search). 
In Vance, a customs officer observed that the traveler was glassy-eyed, disoriented, and had 
trouble answering questions. A pat-down revealed two pairs of underwear and a bulge at the 
traveler’s crotch. When directed to drop his underwear, two packs of methamphetamine fell 
out. Montoya de Hernandez rejected the Ninth Circuit’s use of the “clear indication” language 
as an intermediate standard between “reasonable suspicion” and “probable cause” and estab-
lished that “clear indication” stood for “the necessity for particularized suspicion that the ev-
idence sought might be found within the body of the individual.” 742 U.S. at 540. 
87. 541 U.S. 149, 150, 155 (2004). In this case, the Ninth Circuit had taken the term “routine” from 
Montoya de Hernandez, created a balancing test, and applied it to vehicle searches. Id. at 152. 
The Supreme Court objected, determining that searches of vehicles were subject to a much 
less rigorous standard than searches of a person. Id. The Ninth Circuit went on in United States 
v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005), to ﬁnd the distinction between “routine” and 
“non-routine” inapplicable to searches of property. 
88. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004) (emphasis added) (holding that 
complete disassembly and reassembly of a car gas tank did not require particularized suspi-
cion). 
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In regard to traditional communications, customs officers do not have the 
authority to open and inspect mail weighing sixteen ounces or less.89 They may 
only read correspondence contained in mail sealed against inspection once they 
have obtained either (a) written consent by the sender or addressee or (b) a 
search warrant from a judicial officer that meets the requirements of Rule 41 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.90 These restrictions do not apply to 
mail that has not been sealed against inspection.91 The key difference is the 
sealing of the document. 
Mail weighing more than sixteen ounces that has been sealed against 
inspection can only be opened and searched by a customs officer where there are 
reasonable grounds to suspect that it contains (a) monetary instruments, (b) a 
weapon of mass destruction, or (c) material related to one of six categories.92 
These include: exportation or importation of monetary instruments;93 material 
related to obscenity or child pornography;94 controlled substances;95 nuclear 
materials covered by the Export Administration Act; 96  defense articles and 
services;97 and emergency matters that fall within the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, such as foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments, 
or the import or export of currency or securities.98 
A different provision in the code, the origins of which stem from nineteenth-
century statutes, deals speciﬁcally with opening trunks or envelopes on board 
vessels.99 The standard set is “reasonable cause.” The statute authorizes customs 
offers boarding vessels to “search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in 
which he may have a reasonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was 
 
89. 19 U.S.C. § 1583(d) (2018). 
90. Id. § 1583(c)(2). 
91. Id. § 1583(b). 
92. Id. § 1583(c)(1). 
93. Id. § 1583(c)(1)(A); see also 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2018) (requiring the reporting of the export and 
import of certain monetary instruments). 
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(F); see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1463, 1465, 1466 (2018) (prohibiting the 
interstate sale and transmission of obscene materials). 
95. 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(D); see also 21 U.S.C. § 953 (2018) (listing controlled substances that 
are unlawful to export and certain exceptions to said default prohibition). 
96. 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(G); see also 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2403, 2404, 2415 (2018) (granting the 
President authority to control the export of goods and technology related to nuclear materi-
als). 
97. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2018). 
98. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1702 (2018). 
99. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (recodiﬁed by Rev. Stat. § 3061, which derived from the Act of July 18, 1866, 
ch. 201 § 3, 14 Stat. 178, 178). 
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imported contrary to law.100 The Court has upheld the reasonable-suspicion test 
as applied to border searches as constitutional.101 
E. Extended Border Search and the Functional Equivalent 
For searches away from ports of entry, courts look at whether such actions 
can be upheld as “extended border searches” (i.e., searches proximate to the 
border) as well as whether they take place at the “functional equivalent” of the 
border (i.e., a place that may be far from the physical border, but which acts as 
border crossing). 102  Airports, for instance, are considered the functional 
equivalent of the border.103 The validity of such searches depends upon a variety 
of factors, suggesting a totality-of-circumstances test. As with searches at the 
actual border, the Fourth Amendment standard of “reasonableness” still applies; 
however, mere suspicion is sufficient.104 
In cases of continuous surveillance of vehicles transiting the border, courts 
have upheld searches twenty miles from the border that occur ﬁfteen hours after 
entry.105 On the other hand, for roving searches, the Supreme Court has held 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (holding that the search of an individual arriving 
in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico from the United States did not satisfy Fourth Amend-
ment requirements because the individual did not cross the functional equivalent of an inter-
national border of the United States); United States v. Carter, 760 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985). 
103. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (“For . . . example, a search of the 
passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop ﬂight from 
Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border search.”). 
104. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966) (citing Cervantes v. United States, 
263 F.2d 800, 803 n.5 (9th Cir. 1959)); see also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154, 
(1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623, (1886); Hammond v. United States, 356 F.2d 
931 (9th Cir. 1966); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1965); Jones v. United 
States, 326 F.2d 124, 130 (9th Cir. 1964) (Duniway, J., concurring); Denton v. United States, 
310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962); Mansﬁeld v. United States, 308 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1962); Plazola 
v. United States, 291 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1961); Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 
1961); Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1960); Landau v. U.S. Att’y, 82 F.2d 285 
(2nd Cir. 1936); United States v. Wischerth, 68 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1933); United States v. Yee 
Ngee How, 105 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Cal. 1952). 
105. See, e.g., Bloomer v. United States 409 F.2d 869 (9th Cir. 1969) (upholding s search in which 
an Oldsmobile with marijuana was under constant surveillance from the time it crossed the 
border); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that 
mere suspicion is acceptable for a search that took place ﬁfteen hours after entry and twenty 
miles from the border and that found marijuana hidden in a rear door because the search met 
the totality-of-the-circumstances test—time and distance, extent, and manner); Gonzalez-
Alonso v. United States, 379 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding valid, after applying the total-
ity-of-the-circumstances test, a search that found marijuana in a car after following it eleven 
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invalid a warrantless search, twenty-ﬁve miles north of the border, on an east-
west highway located at all points at least twenty miles from border, absent 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion.106 There is no border exception outside 
the actual border or its functional equivalent.107 
F. Special Protections Afforded to the Home 
As the Supreme Court noted in 1977, “a port of entry is not a traveler’s 
home.”108 For centuries, the courts have applied special protections to the latter. 
From the time of Coke’s Institutes (and, arguably, the Magna Carta), except in 
instances of a ﬂeeing felon or the hue and cry, common law forbade access to the 
home absent a particularized warrant. 109  The need for such a document 
increased pressure on what, precisely, would satisfy the requirement. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Crown began to make use 
of general warrants: documents issued by the monarch or a judicial officer, which 
 
miles inland); Lee v. United States, 376 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 
(holding that the actions of a customs agent who placed a car from Mexico under surveillance 
following a tip and later found narcotics in the car and arrested its occupants were legal be-
cause the car was continuously under surveillance); Leeks v. United States, 356 F.2d 470 (9th 
Cir. 1966) (upholding a search ﬁfteen miles north of the San Ysidro border entry after cus-
toms officers’ continuous tailing); Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (upholding a search in which heroin was discovered after agents 
placed a vehicle crossing into Arizona under surveillance, reasoning that by statute customs 
officers had long had the express authority to stop, search, and examine vehicles suspected of 
carrying merchandise subject to duty, making it possible for them to do what would be “un-
reasonable” for police as long as the totality of the circumstances could convince a factﬁnder 
with reasonable certainty); King v. United States, 348 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 926 (upholding a search by a customs agent who, based on a tip, followed a car at a 
crossing near Tijuana). 
106. See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 266. In Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen with a valid U.S. 
work permit was convicted for possession and transfer of marijuana following a warrantless 
search of his automobile. Id. at 267. The government argued that the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, which provided for warrantless searches “within a reasonable distance [deﬁned 
by regulations as 100 air miles] from any external boundary” authorized the search. Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act § 287(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2018); see also 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 
(2018). In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court ruled that the statute and regulation, which per-
mitted searches within 100 miles of the border, were inconsistent with the Fourth Amend-
ment. The Court also held that the search could not be justiﬁed on the basis of the rules ap-
plied to a search of automobiles. In Carroll v. United States, the Court upheld a clause in the 
Volstead Act that allowed for warrantless searches of automobiles where probable cause ex-
isted. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In this case, however, agents had not met the standard of probable 
cause. 
107. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). 
108. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971). 
109. Donohue, supra note 19, at 1207-12. 
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were not based on any prior evidence of wrongdoing. Instead, general warrants 
were used to ﬁnd criminal activity. They lacked particularity regarding the person 
or place to be searched, or the papers or records to be seized. They were not 
supported by oath or affirmation. The risk was that such nonparticularized 
warrants could be used to target individuals opposed to the Crown, and to ﬁnd 
some reason (or excuse) to subject them to legal process. Treatise writers and 
jurists roundly condemned the practice as unreasonable—in other words, 
against the reason of the common law.110 Only speciﬁc warrants, issued by a 
magistrate, naming the individual, establishing probable cause for a speciﬁc 
crime, and supported by oath or affirmation, met the standard.111 The Framers 
incorporated this common law rule into the Fourth Amendment.112 
Even with a warrant, there were strict limits on what could be sought. 
Particularized warrants only permitted officers to search for the fruits and 
instrumentalities of a crime. They could not look for “mere evidence.” This rule 
did not fall out of favor until 1967, just a few months prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Katz v. United States.113 
As a matter of customs law, from the beginning, Congress and the courts 
drew a distinction between a store or dwelling house, or other structure for 
which a proper warrant was required, and the search of a ship, motorboat, 
wagon, or automobile, where it was not practicable to obtain a warrant because 
the vehicle could be quickly moved. Thus, under the Act of March 3, 1815, it was 
not only lawful to board and search vessels within the customs officers’ districts 
and those adjoining, but also to stop and search any vehicle, beast, or person for 
 
110. Id. at 1269-76. 
111. Id. at 1235-40. 
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Donohue, supra note 19, at 1298-1305. 
113. See Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In constructing the mere 
evidence rule, the Court drew a distinction between the fruits and instrumentalities of crime, 
on the one hand, and other types of materials. In Boyd v. United States, Justice Bradley, writing 
for the Court, explained: “The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods . . . are to-
tally different things from a search for and seizure of a man’s private books and papers for the 
purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against 
him.” 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). For the Court, the two things differed “toto coelo,” (com-
pletely) because “[i]n the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the prop-
erty; in the other it is not.” Id. From the beginning, no one expected the Fourth Amendment 
warrant requirement to apply to contraband or uncustomed goods at the border. Id. at 623-
24. Even as the Court dispensed with the mere evidence rule, in doing so, it agonized that this 
move would be taken as an invitation to pry into the privacies of life. In a post-Katz world, 
the test applied would be not just one of property, but of an objective and subjective expecta-
tion of privacy. For a critique of this standard, see generally Laura K. Donohue, Functional 
Equivalence and Residual Rights Post-Carpenter: Framing a Test Consistent with Precedent and 
Original Meaning, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming). 
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whom there was probable cause to believe unlawful goods had been brought into 
the United States.114 The Court considered it a valid exercise of constitutional 
power.115 To the extent that a question of distance from the border arose, in the 
nineteenth century, the Attorney General drew the line at three miles.116 
In this way, the border exception also bore a striking resemblance to the 
ﬂeeing felon exception: it was only in the hot pursuit of goods illegally brought 
into the country that broader powers could be exercised. Limits still applied. “It 
would be intolerable and unreasonable,” the Court explained, “if a prohibition 
agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of ﬁnding liquor, 
and thus subject all persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience 
and indignity of such a search.”117 As the Court wrote in Carroll v. United States: 
Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary 
because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the 
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as 
effects which may be lawfully brought in. But those lawfully within the 
country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage 
without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent 
official, authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their 
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.118 
 
114. Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232. For total or partial renewals of the statute, see Act 
of Apr. 27, 1816, ch. 110, 3 Stat. 315; Act of Feb. 28, 1865, ch. 67, 13 Stat. 441; Act of July 18, 
1866, ch. 201, 14 Stat. 178; Rev. Stat. § 3061. 
115. Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215 (1883); see also United States v. One Black Horse, 129 F. 167 
(D. Me. 1904). Similar provisions applied to Indian agents who, suspecting the introduction 
of alcohol, could cause the boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds, and places of deposit to be 
searched and seized. Rev. Stat. § 2140 (1875). This power arose from an 1822 statute that al-
lowed for traders’ goods to be searched and seized on basis of suspicion of alcohol, see Act of 
May 6, 1822, ch. 58, 3 Stat. 682), as well as the Act of June 30, 1834, § 20, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 
732. The Supreme Court recognized the Statute of 1822 as sufficient for search and seizure in 
American Fur Co. v. United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 366-67 (1829). All of these statutes are 
cited and discussed in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
116. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 429, § 174, 30 Stat. 1253, 1280. The Attorney General, construing the 
Act, wrote, “If your agents reasonably suspect that a violation of law has occurred, in my opin-
ion they have power to search any vessel within the three-mile limit according to the practice 
of customs officers when acting under section 3059 of the Revised Statutes [Comp. St. 
§ 5761], and to seize such vessels.” Auth. of Agents of the Dep’t of Commerce & Labor to 
Make Arrests, 26 Op. Att’y Gen. 243, 246 (1907). This language is cited and quoted in Carroll, 
267 U.S. at 153. 
117. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153-54. 
118. Id. at 154. 
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In Carroll, the Court noted the necessity of establishing probable cause of a 
felony for a search that occurred away from the border. The border was only 
relevant insofar as it helped to establish probable cause.119 
Reﬂecting these traditions, customs searches of homes currently require a 
warrant, issued by a third-party federal judge or magistrate, and supported by 
probable cause that merchandise has been illegally brought into the United 
States, or that the goods in question are subject to forfeiture.120 The search of 
vehicles or vessels, however, is not limited to the time and place of actual 
international crossings.121 
G. Restrictions on Customs Searches: Who and Why 
Even when the customs exception applies, not every government official is 
permitted to exercise the associated enforcement powers. Courts have held that 
an “officer of the customs” includes customs officers, inspectors, investigators, 
and mail entry aides, certain Immigration and Naturalization Service officials 
(such as border patrol agents), and Coast Guard officers. 122  The term also 
includes a doctor aiding a customs search.123 The right to undertake border 
searches does not extend to the FBI or to law enforcement when acting for 
general law enforcement purposes. 
In the 1979 case of United States v. Vidal Soto-Soto, for example, the Ninth 
Circuit considered the FBI’s warrantless search of a Chevrolet pickup truck at the 
border to determine whether it had been stolen.124 The agent’s sole basis for 
stopping the truck was the make and model of the vehicle. 125  Instead of 
 
119. Id. at 160. 
120. 19 U.S.C. § 1595 (2018). 
121. 19 U.S.C. § 482 (“Any of the officers or persons authorized to board or search vessels may 
stop, search, and examine, as well without as within their respective districts, any vehicle, 
beast, or person, on which or whom he or they shall suspect there is merchandise which is 
subject to duty, or shall have been introduced into the United States in any manner contrary 
to law . . . and to search any trunk or envelope, wherever found, in which he may have a rea-
sonable cause to suspect there is merchandise which was imported contrary to law.”). This 
section dates back to Act of Mar. 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat. 231, 232; Act of July 18, 1866, ch. 201, 
14 Stat. 178. 
122. See Who May Conduct Border Search Pursuant to 19 U.S.C.A. § 482, 1401(i), 1581 (a,b), and 1582, 
61 A.L.R. Fed. 290, at §§ 3, 4; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (deﬁning “customs officer” to mean 
“any commissioned, warrant, or petty officer of the Coast Guard, or any agent or other person, 
including foreign law enforcement officers, authorized by law or designated by the Secretary 
of the Treasury to perform any duties of an officer of the Customs Service.”). 
123. Id. 
124. United States v. Vidal Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1979). 
125. Id. 
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evaluating the case under the customs search exception, the court instead looked 
to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Delaware v. Prouse, in which it had 
required articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist was unlicensed or 
an automobile not registered to detain a vehicle and request the registration 
papers.126 
The broader search authority granted to customs officers is based on the need 
to interdict things illegally brought into the country. As the Ninth Circuit noted, 
“[v]alidity for this distinction is found in the fact that the primordial purpose of 
a search by customs officers is not to apprehend persons, but to seize contraband 
property unlawfully imported or brought into the United States.”127 The court 
observed that “[t]he authorization of section 581 [19 U.S.C. § 1581] is to 
ascertain whether there are any dutiable articles concealed in the vessel; it is not 
to discover acts of criminality.”128 The purpose is “to effectuate the provisions of 
the navigation and tariff laws and to protect the revenue of the United States.”129 
It is not to deter criminal activity writ large.130 
i i i .  immigration border search authorities  
Immigration law has followed a different trajectory from provisions related 
to uncustomed goods and contraband. The doctrine is fraught with 
contradictions regarding the constitutional power of federal versus state 
entities. 131  At the same time, history demonstrates that the primary aim of 
federal immigration inspection has been (a) to establish travelers’ identity; (b) 
to ensure that travelers meet the requirements for legal entry; and (c) to collect 
money to fund immigration services. An additional immigration interest—
namely, keeping convicted criminals out of the country—only applies to non-
citizens. This aim sheds light on some of the differences between CBP and ICE 
regulations. 
 
126. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
127. Alexander v. United States, 362 F.2d 379, 382 (1966); see also Olson v. United States, 68 F.2d 
8 (2d Cir. 1933) (ﬁnding that a “search of a vessel by officers of the Coast Guard or of the 
customs for the purpose of discovering a cargo which might be subject to duty should not be 
regarded as unreasonable even though the search, as distinguished from the seizure, is made 
without probable cause”). 
128. Olson, 68 F.2d at 9. 
129. Id. at 10. 
130. But note that seizure may rest on a violation of criminal law. See Maul v. United States, 274 
U.S. 501 (1927); Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. 342 (1842); Awalt v. United States, 47 F.2d 
477 (3d Cir. 1931). 
131. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitu-
tional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
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In 1790, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, Congress 
introduced rules for naturalization; however, it did not institute any restrictions 
on immigration.132 Through the late nineteenth century, immigration to the 
United States was thus relatively unregulated.133 In 1875, Congress passed the 
ﬁrst federal immigration law. 134  That statute entrusted the inspection of 
immigrants to customs collectors at the ports of entry. It excluded criminals and 
prostitutes and prohibited human trafficking of individuals from Asia.135 The 
inspectors had to ensure that these statutory requirements were met, which 
could only be done at the point of arrival. That same year, the Supreme Court 
ruled that immigration was a matter reserved to the federal government.136 
In Chy Lung v. Freeman, the Court considered a California law that had 
extended signiﬁcant powers of inspection, the ability to charge for every 
examination, and the ability to set a bond for each passenger, to the state 
Commissioner of Immigration. 137  Justice Miller, writing for the Court, 
observed: “The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and 
subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to the 
States.”138 Congress’s dominion over international commerce and its ability to 
shape U.S. foreign affairs were tied to its ability to regulate immigration.139 
 
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress “[t]o establish a uniform rule of naturali-
zation”); An Act to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). 
133. Overview of INS History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (2012) [hereinafter USCIS Re-
port], https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/USCIS/History%20and%20Genealogy
/Our%20History/INS%20History/INSHistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ5V-AA5Z]. Fol-
lowing the Civil War, some states introduced immigration laws. Id. at 3. 
134. Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477. 
135. Id. 
136. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). 
137. See id. at 277-78; 1 THEODORE H. HITTEL, CODES AND STATUTES OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
364-69 (1876) (giving the Commissioner of Immigration the power “to satisfy himself 
whether or not any passenger who shall arrive in this state by vessels from any foreign port or 
place (who is not a citizen of the United States), is lunatic, idiotic, deaf, dumb, blind, crippled 
or inﬁrm, and is not accompanied by relatives who are able and willing to support him, or is 
likely to become permanently a public charge, or has been a pauper in any other country, or 
is, from sickness or disease . . . a public charge, or likely soon to become so, or is a convicted 
criminal, or a lewd or debauched woman”). The Court objected: “It is hardly possible to con-
ceive a statute more skillfully framed, to place in the hands of a single man the power to pre-
vent entirely vessels engaged in a foreign trade . . . from carrying passengers, or to compel 
them to submit to systematic extortion of the grossest kind.” Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 278. 
138. Id. at 280. 
139. Id. (“It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the 
character of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs solely to the 
national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in dis-
astrous quarrels with other nations.”). 
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Fifteen years later, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Court stated that 
although the Constitution did not explicitly address immigration, Congress had 
the general power to pass a statute amending prior treaties and excluding 
Chinese citizens.140 Justice Field, writing for the Court, said, “[t]he question 
whether our government is justiﬁed in disregarding its engagements with 
another nation is not one for the determination of the courts.”141 The decision 
fell to the political branches, rendering any judicial “reﬂection upon [Congress’s] 
motives, or the motives of any of its members,” immaterial.142 The Court wrote: 
That the government of the United States, through the action of the 
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over 
its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. 
It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be 
to that extent subject to the control of another power.143 
Such authority was part of the foreign affairs power of any country, found in the 
interstices of Article I, Section 8, and Article II.144 
With the authority to pass immigration laws ﬁrmly in federal hands, 
Congress passed a series of statutes providing for powers of inspection. Some 
laws, particularly those related to Chinese exclusion and contract labor, focused 
on establishing the identity of travelers.145 Under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 
1882, for instance, the collector of customs in the district from which Chinese 
laborers departed from the United States were empowered to “go on board each 
vessel” and “make a list” of all Chinese laborers, entering the information into 
registry books with details on each worker’s “name, age, occupation, last place 
of residence, physical marks or peculiarities, and all facts necessary 
 
140. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1888); Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 
22 Stat. 58 (“execut[ing] certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese”). 
141. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 602. 
142. Id. (citing Taylor v. Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,799), aff’d, 67 U.S. 481 
(1862)). 
143. Id. at 603-04. 
144. Id. at 604 (“The powers to declare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, 
regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to the States, and admit subjects 
of other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise only by the 
Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less, 
the conduct of all civilized nations.”). 
145. See, e.g., Alien Contract Labor Law of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332 (prohibiting “the importation 
and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the 
United States”); Alien Contract Labor Law of 1887, ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414; Alien Contract Labor 
Law of 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566 (authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to cause immigrants 
landing contrary to prohibitions to be returned within one year of landing). 
customs, immigration, and rights 
989 
for . . . identiﬁcation.”146 The same year, Congress passed another law that es-
tablished a system of central control and created new classes of aliens that would 
be inadmissible to the United States based on whether they were likely to become 
a public burden or exhibited dubious moral character. 147  Measures also ad-
dressed revenue generation, which gave inspectors further powers at the ports 
of entry.148 
In 1891, Congress passed its ﬁrst comprehensive immigration law, creating a 
Bureau of Immigration within the Treasury Department to administer all 
immigration laws (except the Chinese Exclusion Act), and further restricted 
immigration by adding inadmissible classes of persons, empowering the 
Secretary of Treasury to issue rules for inspection along the Canadian border, 
and directing the deportation of illegal aliens.149 In 1893, Congress augmented 
the reporting requirements to include travelers’ occupation, marital status, 
literacy, money in possession, and physical as well as mental health.150 A decade 
later, Congress expanded the list to provide for the exclusion of aliens based on 
political views—including “anarchists, or persons who believe in, or advocate, 
the overthrow by force or violence the government of the United States, or of all 
government, or of all forms of law, or the assassination of public officials.”151 In 
1907, Congress expanded exclusion to cover “imbeciles”, “feeble-minded 
 
146. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, § 4, 22 Stat. 58; see also id. § 1 (suspending entry of 
Chinese laborers for 10 years); id. § 3 (requiring that evidence of residence prior to passage of 
the Act be presented to the master of the vessel and the collector of the port); id. § 8 (requiring 
the master of any vessels arriving in the United States to provide details of any Chinese pas-
sengers on board); id. § 9 (empowering the collector “to examine such passengers, comparing 
the certiﬁcates with the list and with the passengers”). 
147. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 4, 22 Stat. 214 (excluding convicts, except those convicted 
of political offenses, from entry). 
148. See, e.g., id. § 1 (establishing a duty for every passenger arriving in the United States); id. § 3 
(giving the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to establish regulations to protect the 
United States from fraud and loss); Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 2, 39 Stat. 874, 875 
(establishing a tax of eight dollars for every alien, with certain exceptions and establishing for 
its collection by the collector of customs of the port in which the alien arrives). 
149. Alien Contract Law of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084 (excluding certain classes of aliens “in 
accordance with the existing acts regulating immigration,” namely: “[a]ll idiots, insane per-
sons, paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome 
or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other in-
famous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person 
whose ticket is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to come, unless 
it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special inquiry that such person does not belong 
to one of the foregoing excluded classes,” or to the contract laborers excluded by the 1885 
statute). 
150. Act of Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 206, 27 Stat. 569. 
151. Immigration Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213. 
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persons”, persons with physical or mental defects, persons afflicted with tuber-
culosis, children unaccompanied by their parents, persons who admitted the 
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, and women entering the 
country for immoral purposes.152 Just as certain classes of people were excluded, 
others were encouraged to enter, including artists, singers, ministers, professors, 
and domestic servants. Immigration officials had the power to make inquiries 
necessary for these determinations. 
In 1907, Congress established a Joint Commission on Immigration to 
consider the entire system and ten years later implemented the Commission’s 
recommendations. 153  The 1917 statute added new excludable classes and a 
literacy test, and created the Asiatic Barred Zone, which encompassed much of 
the Asian continent.154 During World War I, Congress further passed a measure 
to give the President broad power to control the entry and exit of aliens in the 
interests of public safety.155 
 
For the balance of the twentieth century, immigration measures focused on 
deﬁning admissible aliens. 156  These statutes, without exception, focused on 
 
152. Immigration Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. 
153. Id.; Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874; An Act to Amend Section 23 of the Immi-
gration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874. 
154. Immigration Act of Feb. 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 874, § 3 (excluding “[a]ll idiots, imbeciles, feeble-
minded persons, epileptics, insane persons; persons who have had one or more attacks of 
insanity at any time previously; persons of constitutional psychopathic inferiority; persons 
with chronic alcoholism; paupers; professional beggars; vagrants; persons afflicted with tu-
berculosis in any form or with a loathsome or dangerous contagious disease; persons not 
comprehended within any of the foregoing excluded classes who are found to be and are cer-
tiﬁed by the examining surgeon as being mentally or physically defective, such physical defect 
being of a nature which may affect the ability of such alien to earn a living; persons who have 
been convicted of or admit having admitted a felony or other crime or misdemeanor involving 
moral turpitude; polygamists, or persons who practice polygamy or believe in or advocate the 
practice of polygamy; anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the overthrow by force 
or violence of the Government of the United States, or of all forms of law, or who disbelieve 
in or are opposed to organized government, or who advocate the assassination of public offi-
cials, or who advocate or teach the unlawful destruction of property; persons who are mem-
bers of or affiliated with any organization entertaining and teaching disbelief in or opposition 
to organized government, or who advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety of the 
unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of speciﬁc individuals or of of-
ﬁcers generally, of the Government of the United States or of any other organized govern-
ment . . . prostitutes, or persons coming into the United States for the purpose of prostitution 
or for any other immoral purpose . . . contract laborers . . . all children under sixteen years of 
age, unaccompanied by . . . their parents” and individuals from parts of the Asian Continent). 
155. Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154, 40 Stat. 559. 
156. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5 (setting the ﬁrst quota for aliens 
entering the United States); Act of May 11, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-55, 42 Stat. 540 (extending 
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and amending the Act of May 19, 1921); Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 
153 (establishing the ﬁrst permanent limitation on immigration—the “national origins quota 
system,” which remained in place until the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952); Joint 
Resolution of Mar. 31, 1928, Pub. Res. No. 70-20, 45 Stat. 400 (postponing introduction of 
quotas until July 1929); Act of Apr. 2, 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-234, 45 Stat. 401 (excluding Amer-
ican Indians born in Canada from application of the Immigration Act of 1924); Act of Mar. 2, 
1929, Pub. L. No. 70-962, 45 Stat. 1512 (establishing record of prior lawful admission; subse-
quently folded into the Alien Registration Act of 1940); Act of Mar. 17, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-
61, 47 Stat. 67 (applying the contract labor provisions of the immigration laws to instrumental 
musicians); Act of May 2, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-115, 47 Stat. 145 (doubling allocation for the 
enforcement of the contract labor provisions of the immigration laws); Act of July 1, 1932, 
Pub. L. No. 72-234, 47 Stat. 524 (providing for speciﬁed classes of nonimmigrant aliens to be 
admitted for a prescribed amount of time); Act of July 11, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-277, 47 Stat. 
656 (providing non-quota status to the husbands of American citizens, as wives were already 
accorded non-quota status); Alien Registration Act, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 
(requiring alien registration and making membership in proscribed organizations grounds 
for exclusion); Act of June 20, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-113, 55 Stat. 252 (allowing consular officers 
to refuse a visa to anyone believed to be seeking entry for purposes of engaging in activities 
that would endanger the safety of the United States); Act of June 21, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-114, 
55 Stat. 252 (extending the Act of May 22, 1918 and giving the President the power, during 
national emergency or war, to prevent aliens from entering the United States); Act of Apr. 29, 
1943, Pub. L. No. 78-45, 57 Stat. 70 (providing for the importation of temporary agricultural 
laborers to the United States from the Americas, to help in agriculture during World War II); 
Act of Dec. 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-199, 57 Stat. 600 (amending the Alien Registration Act of 
1940 and adding Chinese persons to the class of aliens eligible for naturalization); Act of Feb. 
14, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-229, 58 Stat. 11 (providing for the importation of temporary workers 
from the Western Hemisphere); Act of June 29, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-471, 60 Stat. 339 (facil-
itating U.S. armed force members’ ﬁancées admission to the United States); Act of July 2, 
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-483, 60 Stat. 416 (amending the Immigration Act of 1917 and giving 
persons of races indigenous to India and Filipino descent admission to the United States); Act 
of May 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-552, 62 Stat. 268 (excluding anarchists and similar classes); 
Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (permitting the ﬁrst formal 
admission of persons ﬂeeing persecution, subject to a quota); Central Intelligence Agency Act 
of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-110, 63 Stat. 208 (authorizing the admission of up to 100 people by 
the CIA annually, where in the interests of national security); Act of June 30, 1950, Pub. L. 
No. 81-857, 64 Stat. 306 (providing for up to 250 skilled sheepherders to be allowed to enter 
the United States); Act of Sept. 22, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-363, 73 Stat. 644 (facilitating the 
entry of ﬁancées and relatives of alien residents and U.S. citizens); Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (abolishing the earlier quota system centered on national origins, 
focusing instead on reuniting families and attracting skilled labor, but still placing a cap on 
immigration from certain countries and on total immigration, as well as on each category of 
immigrants); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (providing a procedure 
for humanitarian aid to be given to refugees from areas of particular interest to the United 
States); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (reforming the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1965 by revising the preference categories and dividing immi-
grants into three categories: family-sponsored, employment-based, and diversity). A few 
measures focused on the structure of the immigration agencies and the border patrol. See, e.g., 
Act of May 28, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-153, 43 Stat. 240 (establishing the U.S. Border Patrol); 
Act of June 4, 1940, ch. 231, 54 Stat. 230 (transferring the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice). 
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establishing identity, encouraging individuals from certain countries (or with 
experience in skilled industries or strong connections to the United States) to 
immigrate, while prohibiting other classes of aliens considered undesirable or a 
threat to the country. A few measures expanded the classes of deportable 
offenses, such as those directed at aliens convicted of crimes related to weapons, 
bombs, or illegal drugs, those who had perpetrated fraud to gain entry, and 
illegal immigrants.157 
By the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the role of immigration 
inspectors had expanded to include: inspecting and admitting individuals 
arriving at ports of entry; administering beneﬁts (such as naturalization); 
granting asylum; patrolling the borders; and apprehending and removing aliens 
who enter illegally, violate requirements of their admission, or present a 
threat.158 The emphasis throughout this time, and continuing to the present day, 
was on ascertaining the identity and citizenship of U.S. citizens and aliens 
seeking entry to the United States. 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, citizens and individuals with a 
substantial connection to the United States beneﬁt from the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment in their interactions with immigration officials.159 Non-U.S. 
persons lacking these characteristics, however, have no such rights. Immigration 
officials thus have broader authorities as to aliens: they can be interrogated, 
arrested, and subjected to more intrusive searches, including searches, “without 
warrant, of the person and of [their] personal effects,” where the immigration 
officer has “reasonable cause to suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission 
to the United States.”160 Congress, to date, has not made any special exceptions 
for the personal effects that may be searched. As a result, guidance on electronic 
devices has been left to the agencies themselves. 
Despite the broader leeway provided to search of aliens, as with customs 
measures, the law still recognizes the greater privacy protections afforded to the 
home, as well as the application of the Fourth Amendment within U.S. borders. 
 
157. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(providing amnesty as well as deportation authorities) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.); Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940) (expanding 
deportable classes to include smuggling, aiding in illegal entry, and membership in proscribed 
organizations and subversion) (codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2018)); Act of May 14, 1937, Pub. 
L. No. 75-79, 50 Stat. 164 (making deportable aliens who secured a visa through fraud); Act 
of Feb. 18, 1931, Pub. L. No. 71-683, 46 Stat. 1171 (establishing deportability for convictions 
related to import, export, manufacture, or sale of heroin, opium, or coca leaves); Act of Mar. 
4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551 (establishing deportability of aliens for convictions 
related to weapons or bombs). 
158. USCIS Report, supra note 133, at 10. 
159. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
160. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1357(a), (c) (West 2018). 
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Thus, even though immigration authorities have the power to search for aliens 
domestically, the law requires either consent or a properly-executed warrant to 
enter onto farm land or any agricultural operation to interrogate individuals as 
to their right to be in the United States.161 
iv.  applicable fourth amendment doctrine  
As CBP and ICE have made increasing use of their border search authorities, 
calls to exempt electronic devices from the exception to the warrant requirement 
have increased.162  The argument is that these devices contain a tremendous 
amount of private information not accessible in a routine border search. Prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Riley v. California, United States v. Jones, and 
Carpenter v. United States, courts generally rejected the argument based on the 
grounds that the search was routine and did not require reasonable suspicion 
(pursuant to the border search exception), or that the actual search in question 
had been conducted with reasonable suspicion.163 However, a few courts did 
determine that forensic examination required a higher standard.164 Since Riley 
and Carpenter, more courts have questioned—and rejected—unfettered access to 
citizens’ electronic devices.165 These courts are correct. The Fourth Amendment 
places a limit on the search of electronic devices, at least as to U.S. persons and 
individuals who have a substantial connection to the United States. 
 
161. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(e) (2018). But note that lower courts have held that the “reasonable distance” 
provision, which allows the Attorney General to determine the distance from the border at 
which probable cause and a warrant are required, is constitutional even though it does not 
insert a neutral magistrate into the review process. United States v. King, 485 F.2d 353 (10th 
Cir. 1973), rev’d on other grounds, Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975). 
162. See, e.g., Sophia Cope & Adam Schwartz, EFF’s Fight to End Warrantless Searches at the Border: 
A Roundup of Our Advocacy, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.eff
.org/deeplinks/2018/01/round-effs-advocacy-against-border-device-searches [https://
perma.cc/A2V7-WWCZ]; Charlie Savage and Ron Nixon, Privacy Complaints Mount over 
Phone Searches at U.S. Border Since 2011, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/12/22/us/politics/us-border-privacy-phone-searches.html [https://perma.cc
/5HS3-8CL2]; Warrantless Border Searches Expand as Courts Grapple with Growing Legal Impli-
cations, A.B.A. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news 
-archives/2018/08/warrantless_borders [https://perma.cc/RNG5-C6LL]. 
163. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ickes, 393 
F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
164. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 962, 962-68 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. 
Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 564-71 (D. Md. 2014). 
165. See, e.g., United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Molina-Isidoro 
884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018); United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54 (D.D.C. 2015); see 
also United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018) (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
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A. Cases Before Riley and Carpenter 
Although the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano left open the possibility, 
under certain circumstances, that reasonable suspicion could be required for 
certain property searches at the border, 166  several courts, prior to Riley and 
Carpenter, considered the search of electronic devices to fall within the ordinary 
border search exception. Others determined that in the particular case before 
them, reasonable suspicion had been met. Still others extended special 
protections to forensic searches. 
1. Cases Holding Electronic Border Searches Are Not Subject to Reasonable 
Suspicion 
Several of the cases permitting electronic border searches without reasonable 
suspicion derive from incidents involving child pornography. In United States v. 
Arnold, for instance, a traveler named Michael Arnold arrived at Los Angeles 
International Airport after a nearly twenty-hour ﬂight from the Philippines.167 
When Arnold went to clear customs, CBP pulled him aside for secondary 
questioning, inspected his luggage, and found a laptop, a separate hard drive, a 
USB stick, and six disks. Agents directed him to turn on his computer. On the 
desktop, agents found folders labeled “Kodak Pictures” and “Kodak Memories.” 
When agents opened the folders, they found photos of naked women. CBP 
called in ICE, who, believing the pictures to include children, detained and 
questioned the traveler. They seized his computer and the storage devices and, 
two weeks later, obtained a warrant. The Department of Justice charged Arnold 
with transporting child pornography. 
Despite the amount of information that could be held on the computer, the 
court did not see that the search raised any Fourth Amendment concerns. 
Neither of the narrow grounds laid out by the Supreme Court in Flores-Montano 
that would require reasonable suspicion (“exceptional damage to property” or 
“particularly offensive manner”) applied. 168  The court was “satisﬁed that 
reasonable suspicion is not needed for customs officials to search a laptop or 
other personal electronic storage devices at the border.”169 When a similar case 
arose in regard to fraudulent alien cards, which were found on a traveler’s hard 
 
166. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155-56 (2004). 
167. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008). 
168. Id. at 1008-09. 
169. Id. at 1008. 
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drive while crossing the border, the Ninth Circuit considered the requirement of 
reasonable suspicion to be foreclosed by Arnold.170 
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Ickes.171 In 
that case, the defendant, driving a van that appeared to be packed with 
everything he owned, crossed the U.S.-Canada border. A search of the van 
uncovered a video camera with a tape of a tennis match in which the camera was 
focused on a young ball boy. Border agents found marijuana seeds and pipes and 
several photo albums of child pornography. They also found a computer and 
seventy-ﬁve diskettes with additional child pornography on them. The court 
ruled the search permissible on the grounds that “[b]oth Congress and the 
Supreme Court have made clear that extensive searches at the border are 
permitted, even if the same search elsewhere would not be.”172 At least one other 
published lower court opinion reached a similar conclusion.173 
2. Cases Finding that the Search Was Supported by Reasonable Suspicion 
Unlike Arnold and the cases where the judiciary has dispensed with the 
reasonable suspicion requirement, in other instances, courts ruled that 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was present at the time of the electronic 
search. The ﬁrst set of cases stemmed from ongoing criminal investigations 
related to the traveler that agents became aware of during the border encounter; 
the second derived from agents observing suspicious activity or uncovering 
illegal substances during the individual’s transit. 
In United States v. Hassanshahi, a traveler’s laptop was seized during an 
international border stop at a U.S. airport. 174  An inquiry into the traveler’s 
identity revealed he was the subject of an ongoing federal investigation into a 
conspiracy to build a computer production facility in Iran in violation of U.S. 
trade embargoes. The court in that case considered agents to have established 
reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a forensic examination of the 
laptop.175 Similarly, in United States v. Saboonchi, a traveler’s name came up in 
 
170. United States v. Singh, 295 F. App’x 190, 191 (9th Cir. 2008). 
171. 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005). 
172. Id. at 502-03. 
173. See, e.g., United States v. McAuley, 563 F. Supp. 2d 672, 673-75 (W.D. Tex. 2008) aff’d, 420 
Fed. App’x 400 (5th Cir. 2011). In United States v. Hampe, the court held that the search of a 
laptop was a routine search and that reasonable suspicion was not required, but it then con-
cluded that the particular facts of the case gave rise to reasonable suspicion that child pornog-
raphy was involved. Crim. No. 07-3-B-W, 2007 WL 1192365, at *4 (D. Me. Apr. 18, 2007), 
adopted by, 2007 WL 1806671 (D. Me. June 19, 2007). 
174. United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014). 
175. Id. at 107. 
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connection with two different export violation investigations.176 The govern-
ment had information that the defendant had purchased two cyclone separators 
that had then been shipped overseas to an entity linked to a company in Iran. 
The court determined that the forensic search of the defendant’s smart phone 
and ﬂash drive had been supported by reasonable suspicion.177 Meanwhile, in 
United States v. Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit determined that border agents had 
reasonable suspicion for their initial search because the defendant had a prior 
conviction for child molestation, frequently traveled to a country associated with 
sex tourism, and carried password-protected ﬁles.178 A handful of lower courts 
found the presence of illegal substances during the search to be sufficient for the 
examination of electronic devices.179 
3. Cases Extending Special Protections to Forensic Investigations 
A third category of cases prior to Riley and Carpenter extended Fourth 
Amendment protections to more intrusive forensic investigations. The most 
prominent case came out of the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Cotterman, 
agents entered a traveler’s name into the Treasury Enforcement Communication 
System (TECS), which revealed a 15-year old child sexual molestation charge. 
Agents referred the defendant and his wife for secondary questioning, ordering 
them to leave their car and belongings behind. A search of the vehicle yielded 
two laptop computers with password-protected ﬁles. The defendant offered to 
assist agents in accessing the information, but the agents declined because of 
concern that the defendant would use the opportunity to sabotage the ﬁles. 
Agents seized the computers and transported them to Tucson, 150 miles away, 
 
176. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014). 
177. Id. at 571. 
178. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 970 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
179. See, e.g., United States v. Mendez, 240 F. Supp. 3d 1005 (D. Ariz. 2017) (ﬁnding reasonable 
suspicion for a mobile phone search at the border after the discovery of drugs in a car); United 
States v. Molina-Isidoro, 267 F. Supp. 3d 900 (W.D. Tex. 2016) (permitting mobile phone 
search with reasonable suspicion at Mexican border after agents found methamphetamine in 
the traveler’s suitcase); United States v. Cano, 222 F. Supp. 3d 876 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (ﬁnding 
reasonable suspicion to download mobile phone data on grounds that it had been used as an 
instrumentality of the crime where agents had found sixteen kilograms of cocaine in the spare 
tire of the defendant’s truck); United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 
(determining that DHS’s manual search of a phone and examination of incoming calls, text 
messages, and the call log was reasonable after agents had found methamphetamine in the car 
and questioned defendant, who said he had been in cell phone communication with a person 
to whom he was reporting); United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 
(ﬁnding that reasonable, particularized suspicion was present where CBP found illegal drugs 
in defendant’s car and searched the defendant’s mobile phone, which had photos of large 
sums of money). 
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for forensic evaluation. Over the course of three days, agents found seventy-ﬁve 
images of child pornography.180 
The court determined that border searches must be limited in time and 
distance: agents needed to have reasonable suspicion that the subject was 
involved in criminal activity. Further, mere suspicion was not enough to justify 
a search.181 The court recognized the unique nature of the type of information 
contained in electronic devices: 
The amount of private information carried by international travelers was 
traditionally circumscribed by the size of the traveler’s luggage or 
automobile. This is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of 
storing warehouses full of information . . . . Laptop computers, iPads 
and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain 
the most intimate details of our lives: ﬁnancial records, conﬁdential 
business documents, medical records and private emails . . . . Electronic 
devices often retain sensitive and conﬁdential information far beyond the 
perceived point of erasure, notably in the form of browsing histories and 
records of deleted ﬁles. This quality makes it impractical, if not 
impossible, for individuals to make meaningful decisions regarding what 
digital content to expose to the scrutiny that accompanies international 
travel.182 
A second case, this time in the District of Maryland, held that the forensic 
border search of any computer or electronic device should be considered 
nonroutine and therefore require reasonable suspicion. 183  The court’s 
justiﬁcation was that, while the government has legitimate concerns about child 
pornography, those concerns do not justify an unregulated assault on citizens’ 
private information—which is what is involved in forensic examination of a hard 
drive.184 
In United States v. Saboonchi, the court took a different approach than that 
followed in Cotterman, where the court had determined that the forensic search 
of a computer that had been imaged was as invasive of the defendant’s privacy 
as a strip search.185 The Saboonchi court took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s 
failure to provide guidelines for what constituted a “forensic” search. 
Distinguishing between routine and nonroutine border searches, the court tried 
 
180. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957-59. 
181. Id. at 962-68 (requiring reasonable suspicion for forensic examination of the laptop). 
182. Id. at 964-65. 
183. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D. Md. 2014). 
184. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966. 
185. Id. 
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to construct a test for determining when a conventional computer search be-
comes a forensic investigation: 
A conventional search at the border of a computer or device may include 
a Customs officer booting it up and operating it to review its contents, 
and seemingly, also would allow (but is not necessarily limited to) 
reviewing a computer’s directory tree or using its search functions to seek 
out and view the contents of speciﬁc ﬁles or ﬁle types . . . . And, just as a 
luggage lock does not render the contents of a suitcase immune from 
search, a password protected ﬁle is not unsearchable on that basis 
alone.186 
In contrast, the Saboonchi court said, a forensic search involves the creation of a 
bitstream copy that is then “searched by an expert using highly specialized 
analytical software—often over the course of several days, weeks or months—to 
locate speciﬁc ﬁles, [] recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data, and analyze 
the structure of ﬁles” and the drive.187 The court provided three explanations for 
why forensic searches should be considered sui generis: ﬁrst, such a search 
creates a copy and uses specialized software to analyze the computer’s contents, 
creating the potential for an unbounded search; second, it provides access to 
deleted material; and third, it provides insight into an individual’s actions away 
from the border that would not otherwise be discoverable.188 
In a similar vein, the First Circuit, in evaluating other kinds of searches, has 
offered the following nonexhaustive list of factors that may be relevant when 
determining whether a search can be characterized as routine: 
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or 
requires the suspect to disrobe; (ii) whether physical contact between 
Customs officials and the suspect occurs during the search; (iii) whether 
force is used to effect the search; (iv) whether the type of search exposes 
the suspect to pain or danger; (v) the overall manner in which the search 
is conducted; and (vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy, if any, are abrogated by the search.189 
These factors appear to be directed towards ascertaining the degree of 
intrusiveness of the search and its affect on the traveler—elements central to 
Fourth Amendment concerns. 
 
186. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 560-61. 
187. Id. at 561. 
188. Id. at 564; see also Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of 
Electronic Devices After Riley v. California, U.S. ATT’Y’S BULL., Nov. 2014, at 10. 
189. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
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B. Riley v. California: Stronger Constitutional Protections for Mobile Devices 
The above cases predated Riley v. California, in which the Supreme Court 
recognized the unique incursions into privacy occasioned by the search of a 
mobile device.190 In holding that search of a cell phone incident to arrest required 
a warrant supported by probable cause, the Court underscored the distinction 
between electronic devices and other, physical items. The sheer capacity of 
mobile devices had important implications for privacy.191 
In Riley, the court noted that more than ninety percent of American adults 
own and carry cell phones, keeping “on their person a digital record of nearly 
every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”192 The type of 
information gleaned differs in important respects from what can be uncovered 
from physical search. Cell phones contain medical records, location information, 
relationship details, political beliefs, religious convictions—in fact, more than 
could be ascertained even from the search of an individual’s home.193 Beyond 
this, mobile phones provide a gateway to vast amounts of data stored remotely 
in the cloud. The Court in Riley was unsatisﬁed with the government’s proposal 
to “disconnect a phone from the network before searching the device,”194 which 
CBP has adopted for electronic border searches. For the Court, even 
disconnected from the cloud, mobile phones contained vast amounts of private 
data. 
One of the ﬁrst border search cases to apply Riley was United States v. Kim, in 
which the court determined that the question of electronic searches was settled 
neither by the border exception nor by application of what was meant by 
 
190. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). There were two cases on appeal in Riley. See United 
States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, No. 11-1792, 2013 WL 4080123 
(1st Cir. July 29, 2013). In Wurie, the First Circuit held that the search incident to arrest ex-
ception did not authorize the warrantless search of a mobile telephone. Id. at 13. Quoting the 
Seventh Circuit, the court observed that “[a]t the touch of a button a cell phone search be-
comes a house search, and that is not a search of a ‘container’ in any normal sense of that 
word, though a house contains data.” Id. at 8-9 (quoting United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 
F.3d 803, 806 (7th Cir. 2012)). The First Circuit, however, rejected the Seventh Circuit’s ﬁnal 
determination, concluding that cell phone search incident to arrest was not supported by the 
justiﬁcation in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). There, the Court permitted police 
arresting a person in their home to search the area within immediate reach of the person. The 
First Circuit also determined that the scope of the information obtained exceeded the purpose 
of the warrant exception. Id. at 8-12. 
191. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489. 
192. Id. at 2490. 
193. Id. at 2490-91. 
194. Id. at 2491. 
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“forensic.”195 Instead, the court in Kim considered the extent to which the search 
“intrudes upon an individual’s privacy on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental 
interests.”196 The court noted: 
[W]hile the courts in Ickes, Cotterman, and Saboonchi had little in the way 
of Supreme Court precedent to guide their way, the Supreme Court has 
since issued its opinion in Riley v. California. And in Riley, the Court made 
it clear that the breadth and volume of data stored on computers and 
other smart devices make today’s technology different in ways that have 
serious implications for the Fourth Amendment analysis.197 
Under a totality of circumstances test, the court found that the imaging and 
search of a laptop, for an unlimited period and without any limits on the scope 
of the analysis, invaded the traveler’s privacy to such an extent that it was 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.198 The court noted that “given the 
vast storage capacity of even the most basic laptops, and the capacity of 
computers to retain metadata and even deleted material, one cannot treat an 
electronic storage device like a handbag simply because you can put things in it 
and then carry it onto a plane.”199 
The Kim case is notable not just for its application of Riley, but because it 
involved a decision by investigators to wait until a suspect left the United States 
before using the border exception to search his laptop and thereby obtain 
detailed information about his activities.200 The court ultimately rejected the 
agents’ approach of using the border search exception to obtain information to 
which they otherwise would not be entitled.201 
 
195. United States v. Kim, 103 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54 (D.D.C. 2015). 
196. Id. at 55 (quoting Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484). 
197. Id. at 54. 
198. Id. at 59. 
199. Id. at 50. 
200. Id. at 38-39. Riley’s treatment of electronic devices has inﬂuenced judicial analysis of not just 
the border exception, but other doctrinal Fourth Amendment exceptions. See, e.g., United 
States v. Lara, 815 F.3d 605, 610-12 (9th Cir. 2016) (applying Riley to probation officers’ 
searches); United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 942-43 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Riley to the 
vehicle search exception); cf. United States v. Henry, 827 F.3d 16, 28 (1st Cir. 2016) (rejecting 
Riley in the plain view context because law enforcement had obtained a warrant prior to search 
of the phone). 
201. Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d 101, 120-21 (D.D.C. 2014)). 
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Despite Kim, the government has argued that the courts have “repeatedly 
rejected” applying Riley to the border search exception.202 That statement is 
misleading: while a number of Ninth Circuit lower court cases have not applied 
Riley, they are bound by Cotterman unless the court ﬁnds the two cases to be 
“clearly irreconcilable.” 203  Similarly, lower courts in the Fourth Circuit are 
subject to Ickes.204 
Other courts post-Riley have considered forensic examination of mobile 
phones to be nonroutine and have allowed searches only upon a showing of 
individualized suspicion or probable cause. In United States v. Kolsuz, the Fourth 
Circuit held that the forensic border search of a mobile device required 
individualized suspicion.205 In that case, Mr. Kolsuz was detained when CBP 
uncovered ﬁrearms parts in his luggage. 206  Agents seized his phone and 
subjected it to a month-long forensic examination, generating a nearly 900-page 
report on the contents of the device. The district court determined that, under 
Riley, the forensic investigation was nonroutine but justiﬁed by reasonable 
suspicion.207 The Fourth Circuit agreed that nonroutine searches require some 
level of individualized suspicion. It did not, however, reach the question of 
whether reasonable suspicion was sufficient, or if probable cause was 
required.208 Because probable cause had been present, the good faith exception 
applied and the court was not required to suppress the information. 
In United States v. Molina-Isidoro, the Fifth Circuit declined to announce a 
rule regarding the application of the border search exception to the modern 
technologies for which the Supreme Court, in Riley, had recognized increased 
 
202. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 25, Alasaad v. Nielsen, 
No. 17-CV-11730-DJC (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 2017). 
203. United States v. Caballero, 178 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“Although Riley could 
be applied to a cell phone search at the border, this Court is bound by Cotterman.”) (citing 
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013)); see also United States v. Mendez, 
240 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2017); United States v. Ramos, 190 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1002-
03 (S.D. Cal. 2016); United States v. Cano, 222 F. Supp. 3d 876, 878 (S.D. Cal. 2016); United 
States v. Hernandez, No. 15-CR-2613-GPC, 2016 WL 471943, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2016); United States v. Lopez, No. 13-CR-2092-WQH, 2016 WL 7370030, at *5 (S.D. Cal. 
Dec. 20, 2016). But see United States v. Escarcega, 685 Fed. App’x 354 (5th Cir. 2017); United 
States v. Feiten, No. 15-20631, 2016 WL 894452, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2016); United 
States v. Blue, No. 1-14-CR-244-SCJ, 2015 WL 1519159, at *2 (N.D. Ga. April 1, 2015). 
204. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505-06 (4th Cir. 2005). 
205. 890 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2018). 
206. Id. at 136. 
207. Id.; see also United States v. Kolsuz, 185 F. Supp. 3d 843, 856 (E.D. Va. 2016) (using Riley to 
evaluate the privacy interest at stake). 
208. 890 F.3d at 136. 
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privacy interests.209 Its rationale is of note: having found several kilos of meth-
amphetamine in the traveler’s suitcase, CBP looked at some applications on her 
phone. According to the court, “the nonforensic search of Molina-Isidoro’s cell 
phone at the border was supported by probable cause. That means, at a mini-
mum, the agents had a good-faith basis for believing the search did not run afoul 
of the Fourth Amendment.”210 
In United States v. Vergara, a divided Eleventh Circuit panel considered the 
warrantless forensic search of three phones at the border.211 The majority stated: 
“Border searches ‘never’ require probable cause or a warrant. And we require 
reasonable suspicion at the border only ‘for highly intrusive searches of a person’s 
body such as a strip search or an x-ray examination.’” 212  Judge Jill Pryor, 
dissenting, agreed “that the government’s interest in protecting the nation is at 
its peak at the border,” but she faulted the majority for ignoring the implications 
of Riley.213 In her view, “a forensic search of a cell phone at the border requires a 
warrant supported by probable cause.”214 
C. The Effect of Carpenter v. United States 
As with Riley, the Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States has 
implications for how to think about electronic border searches.215 In that case, a 
man arrested for a series of robberies provided the mobile telephone numbers of 
his alleged accomplices to the FBI.216 Prosecutors applied for a court order under 
the Stored Communications Act to direct service providers to supply them with 
“[a]ll subscriber information, toll records and call detail records including listed 
and unlisted numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted to and from [the] target 
 
209. 884 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2018). 
210. Id. at 289. 
211. United States v. Vergara, 884 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, No. 16-15059 (Oct. 1, 
2018). 
212. Id. at 1312 (quoting United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977)); see also United States 
v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2018). In Touset, Judge William Pryor reached the same 
conclusion as in Vergara, applying the case to another border search of a mobile device, and 
stating that an agent’s search of electronic devices at the border does not need to be based on 
suspicion and, in any event, reasonable suspicion was present in this case. 
213. 884 F.3d at 1313 (Pryor, J., dissenting). 
214. Id. 
215. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
216. Id. at 2212. 
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telephones” as well as “cell site information for the target telephones . . . for in-
coming and outgoing calls” for the suspects.217 
Concerned by the volume and intrusiveness of location information, the 
Court created an exception to third-party doctrine.218 Its reasoning built on the 
so-called “shadow majority” in United States v. Jones, in which ﬁve justices 
adopted the view that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
whole of their physical movements.219 For the Court, the purpose of the Fourth 
Amendment was to secure the privacies of life from arbitrary power and to place 
obstacles in the way of excessive government surveillance.220 Over the years, 
technology had repeatedly disrupted that balance. Justice Roberts, citing Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States, explained that as “more far-
reaching means of invading privacy . . . become available to the Government,” it 
was up to the Court “to ensure that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode 
Fourth Amendment protections.”221 Just as Kyllo v. United States responded to 
sense-enhancing technology (in that case, thermal imaging), 222  Riley had 
recognized the “vast store of sensitive information” available on a mobile 
device. 223  In jettisoning the application of the third-party doctrine to 
geolocational data, the Court focused on two areas: the nature of the documents 
being sought and limitations on any legitimate expectations of privacy. Both 
factors should shape border search doctrine going forward.224 
1. Nature of Documents Being Sought 
In examining the nature of the documents sought, Chief Justice Roberts ﬁrst 
looked at the number of people implicated, observing that there are 
approximately 400 million electronic devices in the United States, making 
virtually everyone in America subject to the provisions. 225  The Court 
 
217. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2018); United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886 (6th 
Cir. 2016). 
218. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2223; see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States 
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); see also Donohue, supra note 113; Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth 
Amendment in a Digital World, 71 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553 (2017). 
219. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
220. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214. 
221. Id. at 2223 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473-74 (1928)). 
222. Id. at 2214 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 35 (2001)). 
223. Id. (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 2484 (2014)). 
224. In addition to the factors considered in this Essay, signiﬁcant property interest rights are pre-
sent in the context of border searches. For a detailed discussion of how to read the Fourth 
Amendment in this context, see Donohue, supra note 113. 
225. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
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acknowledged that the type of information at stake conveyed the intimate details 
of one’s life. It was “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,”226—not 
unlike the massive amount of information contained on a mobile phone, iPad, 
or computer. It provided near perfect recall, making the data different than 
information that could be conveyed by another individual—even a party to the 
underlying action in question.227 The fact that the information was broad and 
increasingly more nuanced mattered, as did the fact that the resource constraints 
on obtaining such information were falling away.228 The Court noted its concern 
that the information was retroactive, giving “police access to a category of 
information otherwise unknowable.”229 Based on these observations, the Court 
determined that the data at issue was particularly sensitive and therefore 
deserved protections not afforded by third-party doctrine. 
Each of the factors highlighted by the Court applies to the search of mobile 
devices at the border. Most people entering or leaving the country carry their 
electronic devices with them to satisfy a host of logistical and recreational needs. 
Travelers also need their devices once they reach their destination. This 
information provides deep insight into the most intimate aspects of travelers’ 
lives. 
It is possible, of course, for users to delete all of the information from their 
devices, to place it on a hard drive or on the cloud, and to later restore it; or, 
alternatively, to use a different telephone or laptop devoid of any private 
information. But in addition to contradicting the basic Fourth Amendment 
position articulated by the Court in Carpenter, it would be an unreasonable 
expectation and one with numerous harmful consequences. For instance, it may 
be expensive to purchase a hard drive or cloud access, or to rent (or buy) an 
alternative device. At the very least, it would take time and may well exceed the 
average traveler’s technological knowledge. For individuals who use their travel 
time to work, to answer email, or to prepare for meetings, deleting this 
information would be highly disruptive and result in a detrimental impact on 
productivity. For those using the devices for personal or social reasons, they 
would be unable to do so while en route. Such an approach would essentially 
create a technological black hole at the border, while opening up the possibility 
that all travelers’ data could be intercepted when they restore information 
overseas. Alternatively, while overseas, citizens might lose access to possibly 
vitally-important data, unless they could access the cloud. One possible 
counterargument is that travelers could simply place their devices in airplane 
 
226. Id. at 2216; see also id. at 2220. 
227. Id. at 2219. 
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mode. But this does nothing to eliminate access to everything held on the device 
itself, which the Court in Riley was at pains to note included the full range of the 
privacies of life. 
The Court in Carpenter, moreover, acknowledged the privacy interests at 
stake in geolocational data in particular. Most mobile devices contain GPS chips, 
which allow them to communicate with satellites to pinpoint a user’s location. 
Location data can then be logged by the device and various applications. Google 
Maps, for example, logs your information as you move and stores where you 
have been. That history is accessible to anyone who accesses the device. Social 
media platforms like Foursquare, Twitter, or Facebook include location 
information when you post.230 Location data, unless expressly turned off, is 
further embedded in photographs and videos as geotags—i.e., the precise 
longitude and latitude of where the photo was taken—and time stamps. Under 
Carpenter, search of this information is a search for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, and it requires a warrant, supported by probable cause, to access it for 
seven days or more.231 
The same characteristics of geolocational data, additionally, apply to the 
myriad types of information held on an electronic device. They incorporate 
calendars, address books, private correspondence, ﬁnancial records, memos, and 
documents of every sort, as well as pictures, books travelers have read or are 
reading, and detailed information on intimate relationships. Like cell site 
location information (CSLI), such information is “detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled.” 232  For the Court in Carpenter, the level of detail and 
precision and retroactive nature of the data all mattered. By using the map 
function or the GPS chip, the government can not only “travel back in time to 
retrace a person’s whereabouts,” 233  but can also access all of the user’s 
correspondence—for decades, possibly—even when the user has tried to delete 
this information from their laptop. In searching electronic devices, the 
government can access data not just for information held on the actual machine, 
but for data stored in the cloud. The upshot is that the government, without any 
probable cause, can subject an individual’s entire life to scrutiny, bypassing the 
Fourth Amendment altogether. As for the diminishing resource constraints, this 
is no less true of border searches: where before the government would have had 
to obtain a warrant, send officers, and knock and announce at a home before 
 
230. So many people are unaware of this feature that the website PleaseRobMe.com has been cre-
ated to inform people and to teach them how to turn it off. See Raising Awareness About Over-
Sharing, http://pleaserobme.com [https://perma.cc/936Q-GZKE]. 
231. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
232. Id. at 2216. 
233. Id. at 2218. 
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entering to search, now, at the push of a button, all of the information that could 
have otherwise been obtained from the home—plus a great deal more—can be 
collected from electronic devices at the border. 
2. Legitimate Expectations of Privacy 
The second aspect of the Court’s inquiry regarding the expectation of privacy 
with respect to geolocational data is no less relevant to border search of electronic 
devices writ large. The Court noted that location data was not in any sense 
voluntarily shared. Mobile phones have become such a pervasive part of life that 
they are not optional.234 The Court further acknowledged that individuals do 
not have to do anything to have their location recorded by the service provider, 
nor is it an option not to create a record.235 Therefore, in no meaningful sense is 
there an assumption of risk.236 
In obtaining information during a border search directly from the phone itself, 
and not from the service provider, the third-party doctrine drops away 
altogether. As for the argument that a traveler assumes the risk that border 
agents will search their electronic devices, only one of two options might apply. 
First, the argument could be made that, by using an electronic device, an 
individual summarily consents to, or assumes the risk that, the government will 
search it. But this is plainly not true. 237  Individuals do not knowingly and 
voluntarily share their lives with the government simply by using digital devices. 
Mobile phones, tablets, and computers are private, often encrypted, and 
protected by multiple passwords for different applications. The devices are 
stored inside the home, often replacing many of the records that would 
otherwise be documented on paper and placed in ﬁling cabinets and drawers. 
And consumers demand that providers exercise network security. As ours has 
become a digital world, these documents have evolved, but their essential quality 
remains. Simply by living in the modern world, individuals do not assume a new 
risk that the government will gain access to their most sensitive information. 
Such logic ﬂies in the face of the Court’s holding in Riley. 
The second possibility would be that by moving or traveling with an 
electronic device across the border, individuals assume the risk that their entire 
 
234. Id. at 2200 (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid 
leaving behind a trail of location data.”). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. (“[I]n no meaningful sense does the user voluntarily ‘assume[] the risk’ of turning over a 
comprehensive dossier of his physical movements.”) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 745 (1979)). 
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lives will be examined by the government. But it is contradictory to say that mo-
bile electronic devices have become an integral part of life, such that it is neces-
sary to have them to live in the modern world, and then to say that such devices 
are optional when one travels abroad. They are not. This argument also does not 
comport with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on general warrants, as was 
recognized in the Supreme Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez.238 U.S. citizens 
do not forfeit their Fourth Amendment rights when they travel overseas. The 
government’s argument would create a Constitution-free zone at every port of 
entry, where citizens have Fourth Amendment rights inside and outside the 
United States, but not as they cross the border. That is not how the Constitution 
works. It applies to the people of the United States at all times. Just as the fact 
that the geolocational records in Carpenter were obtained from a third party was 
not enough to overcome Fourth Amendment interests,239 so too is the fact that 
an electronic search occurs at the border insufficient to overcome citizens’ con-
stitutional rights. 
D. Digital Communications and Electronic Mail 
As was detailed earlier in this Essay, special protections extend to the transfer 
of physical mail across the border. These further illustrate the extent to which 
CBP and ICE practices in regard to digital communications run afoul of 
constitutional limits—a limit explicitly recognized by the Court in Carpenter as a 
modern analogue.240 
As aforementioned, officials inspecting mail that weighs less than sixteen 
ounces must ﬁrst obtain a warrant to ensure that Fourth Amendment standards 
are met. This rule provides a sharp contrast to CBP’s current practice regarding 
email. To be sure, warrants are not required for paper correspondence unless the 
mail is sealed. But the equivalent in the digital realm is use of a password or 
encryption. At present, though, CBP policy permits agents to read travelers’ 
emails with no suspicion of any wrongdoing whatsoever, and, under the current 
regulations, CBP and ICE can insist that travelers provide the passwords to their 
electronic devices. Barring cooperation, they can simply keep the machines and 
use sophisticated techniques to bypass the protections otherwise instituted to 
keep prying eyes from seeing personal information. 
The distinction between the protections afforded digital and paper 
correspondence does not track the relevant privacy interests, which apply equally 
 
238. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
239. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2200. 
240. Id. at 2222 (citing and quoting id. at 2230 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)) (citing United States v. 
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to many forms of digital communications: from emails and text messages, to 
communications embedded in applications such as Instagram or WhatsApp 
Messenger. Regardless of the medium, they memorialize the substance of 
communications between individuals that would be protected under the Fourth 
Amendment if it were written on paper. While the sealing of the envelope plays 
a key role in the doctrine for paper correspondence, there is no relevant 
difference in a traveler’s decision to password-protect electronic devices as well 
as access to email, text messages, or applications. 
While the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonable suspicion to access 
to mail that weighs more than sixteen ounces or for trunks or envelopes on board 
vessels transiting the border,241 that standard is still higher than that currently 
required for border searches of electronic devices. For the latter, no suspicion 
whatsoever is required. In addition, postal provisions that allow the government 
to search mail weighing over sixteen ounces or trunks or envelopes on board 
vessels, only allow officials to look for money, weapons of mass destruction, or 
contraband falling into one of the six categories. Even then, the government may 
only search for contraband based on reasonable suspicion of uncustomed goods. 
No provision permits monitoring for criminal or political activity writ large. Yet 
such searches are entirely consistent with the current regime governing 
electronic search at the border, regardless of the volume or extent of the ﬁles 
being inspected. 
v. digital contraband, customs, and immigration  
Customs and immigration both deal with the movement of physical objects. 
As this Essay has explained, the purpose behind these regimes is not to identify 
general criminal activity.242 It is to prevent contraband and uncustomed goods 
from crossing the border, and to ascertain the identity and citizenship of 
individuals seeking entry to determine whether to admit foreign nationals.243 
Before concluding, it is important to narrow the discussion to recognize two 
potential challenges grounded in the legitimate interests of CBP and ICE. 
 
241. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 612 (1977). 
242. United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Montoya 
de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)). 
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A. Illegal Goods 
How should we think about illicit materials that happen to be digitized? A 
strong argument could be mounted that digital contraband, after all, is still 
contraband and thus well within CBP’s domain. This is a sort of reverse of the 
functional rule of equivalence that I have elsewhere argued should govern the 
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 244  Applied in this context, the 
argument runs: digital contraband still functions as material that Congress has 
prohibited, often because of the risk of harm. Just because something is carried 
on an iPad, instead of inside a knapsack, its purpose does not necessarily alter. 
So why should it enjoy a higher level of protection than its physical counterpart? 
Worse, why should a criminal escape detection merely because she decides to 
digitize illegal material? Does this not set up a reverse incentive? 
Child pornography, nuclear weapon designs, and counterfeit currencies, for 
instance, are all expressly forbidden under customs laws.245 Why should the fact 
that a traveler carries them on an electronic device, instead of physically 
transporting a three dimensional representation, require the government to take 
additional steps to intercept it prior to importation? The materials encapsulate 
the same illegal behavior or threats. Shouldn’t there be a way to foreclose a digital 
end-run around the customs regime? By not allowing officials to access the 
cloud, there is a real risk that travelers can simply transfer contraband from their 
devices to the cloud prior to entering the U.S., only to later download it within 
domestic borders. 
The strongest response to the equivalence argument centers on the search, 
similarly considering the function of the search in the contemporary context. It 
 
244. See Donohue, supra note 113. 
245. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1583(a)(1), (2) (2018) (empowering customs officials to engage in war-
rantless searches of international mail in relation to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1463, 1465, and 1466, 
which relate to obscenity and child pornography); id. at § 1583(d) (exempting from inspec-
tion sealed mail weighing less than 16 ounces); id. at § 1583(c)(1)(F) (empowering customs 
officials to search outgoing mail weighing in excess of 16 ounces sealed against inspection 
where there is reasonable cause to suspect that such mail contains child pornography); 6 
U.S.C. § 211(c)(2) (2018) (tasking the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
with ensuring “the interdiction of persons and goods illegally entering or existing the United 
States”); id. at § 211(c)(5) (requiring the commissioner to “detect, respond to, and interdict 
terrorists . . . and other persons who may undermine the security of the United States”); id. 
at § 211(c)(6) (requiring the commissioner to “safeguard the borders of the United States to 
protect against the entry of dangerous goods”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (2018) (pro-
hibiting the knowing international transportation or shipment of child pornography); id. 
§ 2252(a)(2) (prohibiting receipt or distribution of child pornography); id. § 2252(4) (out-
lawing possession of child pornography); 19 U.S.C. § 1583(c)(1)(A) (providing for the exam-
ination of outbound mail); 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2018) (requiring the reporting of the export and 
import of certain monetary instruments). 
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is not just digital contraband that is at stake once the Court allows the 
government to examine the mobile device or, through it, material held online. It 
is the traveler’s entire life, as well as signiﬁcant amounts of others’ private affairs. 
It therefore is at once both intensely personal (as applied to that person and her 
family, friends, and acquaintances), and intrusive. While the search of a 
backpack, luggage, or shipping container might also reveal certain private 
matters, it does not in the process transmit the whole of a person’s life. 
To the extent that electronic searches reveal information that would 
otherwise be held in the home, moreover, historic protections drop away, 
steadily narrowing rights. Email has replaced letter correspondence, electronic 
calendars now take the place of planners, and the contacts list now serves as a 
telephone book. The border exception, applied to electronic devices, threatens 
to swallow protections which, for centuries, have limited government power. 
An approach that takes into account the broader context of the search 
performed on the digital device dovetails with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The Court regularly applies a totality-of-the-circumstances 
analysis to probable cause determinations.246 It uses it to determine reasonable 
suspicion.247 And it employs it to ascertain voluntariness in granting consent to 
search.248 In regard to electronic devices at the border, digital searches in which 
swathes of information becomes subject to government inspection changes the 
quality of the search itself. It is not the equivalent of looking in someone’s 
luggage. 
The Court has already taken this position in regard to the search of electronic 
devices within U.S. borders. In Riley, it held that the government could not 
search a mobile phone incident to arrest because the quality of the search itself 
was different.249 The Court explained: “Cell phones . . . place vast quantities of 
personal information literally in the hands of individuals. A search of the 
information on a cell phone bears little resemblance to . . . physical search.”250 
 
246. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 238-39 (1983) (reaffirming “the “totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances” analysis that traditionally has informed probable cause determinations); see also 
Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813) (“[T]he term ‘probable cause,’ ac-
cording to its usual acceptation . . . imports a seizure made under circumstances which war-
rant suspicion.”). 
247. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (“When discussing how reviewing courts 
should make reasonable-suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must 
look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has 
a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’”). 
248. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“[W]hether a consent to a search was in 
fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of 
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.”). 
249. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014). 
250. Id. 
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Because of this, the Court held that officers generally would be required to obtain 
a warrant.251 
This also is the approach the Court has adopted regarding the border search 
exception writ large: the government cannot use the exception physically to 
search for undutied goods, contraband, and illegal entrants located on private 
property precisely because of the heightened privacy interests at stake. The 
founders were well aware of the dangers of allowing the government 
untrammeled access to individuals’ lives. The border exception was therefore 
tailored to the country’s sovereign interests in revenue generation and admitting 
qualiﬁed aliens, but it did not permit searches that went further aﬁeld. 
And what of the end-run around customs by separating digital contraband 
from a particular traveler—for instance, by uploading it to the cloud, only to 
subsequently download it inside U.S. borders? Should Customs be able to access 
this information through the devices carried across international frontiers, 
potentially forcing the owners or users to provide passwords? 
The ﬁrst point to raise in response is that in-person physical transit has never 
been required for illegal goods to enter the country. The closest analogue would 
be use of the postal system. But as this Essay has explained, protections have 
been extended to the mail. A basic level of suspicion must be met to open sealed 
envelopes or packages of certain sizes. 
A second point addresses the cloud concern: in a digital era, it is not only at 
ports of entry that the government has the opportunity to intercept digital 
contraband. Numerous laws, predicated on some level of individualized 
suspicion, provide an alternative means to access such materials. Law 
enforcement has the power to intercept wire, oral, and electronic 
communications related to a broad range of offenses, including all of those of 
interest to customs.252 For stored communications, the government can obtain a 
 
251. Id. 
252. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (2018) (including any offense punishable by death or by impris-
onment for more than one year related to enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the 
sabotage of nuclear facilities or fuel, espionage, kidnapping, treason, malicious mischief, the 
destruction of vessels, or piracy); id § 2516(b) (relating to murder, kidnapping, robbery, or 
extortion); id § 2516(c) (relating to, among others, violence at international airports, animal 
enterprise terrorism, arson, bribery, use of explosives, concealment of assets, transmission of 
wagering information, nuclear and weapons of mass destruction threats, explosive materials, 
loan and credit applications, protection of foreign officials, witness tampering, obstruction of 
criminal investigations, human trafficking, presidential staff, assassination, kidnapping, as-
sault, interstate and foreign travel or violence linked to racketeering, theft, fraud, sexual ex-
ploitation of children, child pornography, stolen property, destruction of aircraft or aircraft 
facilities, mail fraud, computer fraud and abuse, nuclear material transactions, conspiracy, re-
production of naturalization or citizenship papers or passports, or forgery); id at § 2516(d) 
(counterfeiting); id at § 2516(g) (relating to currency transactions). 
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court order based on “speciﬁc and articulable facts showing that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information sought, are relevant and 
material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”253 The order can be served on 
electronic communication or remote computing services.254 The government 
can also obtain stored communications 180 days old (or less) via a warrant.255 In 
2016, changes to Rule 41 enabled agencies to obtain a warrant for remote access 
search and seizure of digital information.256 
Foreign intelligence surveillance authorities also play a role in addressing 
international criminal conspiracies. In light of post-9/11 changes to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act,257 and the infamous demise of the wall between 
foreign intelligence and criminal investigations, foreign intelligence laws are 
used to monitor international threats, even when the primary purpose of 
surveillance is criminal in nature.258 To the extent that provisions like the FISA 
Amendments Act do not apply, collection techniques consistent with Executive 
Order 12,333 may.259 In the context of non-U.S. persons, the government has 
even broader authorities.260 
For digital data, as a matter of constitutional law, increasingly stringent 
requirements must be met for more invasive searches Because of the nature of 
electronic devices, no search can take place without, at a minimum, reasonable 
suspicion. The types of crimes to which such searches can be directed are only 
those explicitly authorized by Congress—not general criminal activity. For more 
invasive searches, probable cause and a warrant are required. Even here, the 
search must be appropriately circumscribed to avoid the type of general warrants 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
253. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
254. Id. § 2703(b), (c). 
255. Id. § 2703(a). 
256. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
257. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1979 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
261, 122 Stat. 2436. 
258. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considera-
tions, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757 (2014). 
259. Exec. Order 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1982), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 3001 app. at 418-
27 (2013). 
260. See generally Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and 
Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015); The Case for Reforming Section 702 of 
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 26, 2017), https://
www.cfr.org/report/case-reforming-section-702-us-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-law 
[https://perma.cc/U39E-JPF5]. 
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B. Immigration 
A second major challenge to this Essay’s argument could be raised regarding 
immigration. One might argue that part of the reason the government subjects 
noncitizens to searches prior to entering the United States is to ascertain whether 
they are who they purport to be, and what sorts of individuals are being admitted 
to the country. Surely, the type of information present in travelers’ electronic 
devices is relevant to such a determination. It could be considered irresponsible 
not to look at social media or the full range of an individual’s background—
particularly where U.S. national security is on the line. Certainly, the powers of 
sovereignty undergirding the border exception provide adequate room for such 
examinations. 
This is a strong argument. However, it does not apply to U.S. persons. Once a 
traveler establishes her identity as a citizen or legal resident, if there are no arrest 
alerts or other warrant notiﬁcations tied to the passport, there is no reason, under 
traditional immigration provisions, to commence a search. This is a bright-line 
rule. Probable cause must exist for a search of the person and, even then, it must 
meet the particularity required in the second clause of the Fourth Amendment. 
The challenge thus applies solely to aliens. Here, as a constitutional matter, 
the government has more latitude than with regard to U.S. persons. Part of the 
function of the immigration services is to ascertain whether aliens admitted to 
the United States—either as visitors or as potential citizens—meet the policies 
set by Congress. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Verdugo-Urquidez, a non-
U.S. person lacking a substantial connection to the United States does not enjoy 
Fourth Amendment protections. To the extent, then, that the executive seeks to 
build proﬁles of non-U.S. persons entering or leaving the United States, the 
question appears primarily to be one of policy and statute, not one of 
constitutional law. 
Nevertheless, as a constitutional matter, as well as an historical one, it 
remains for Congress, not the executive branch, to make this determination. An 
additional policy consideration is worth noting: in granting visitors access to the 
United States, the point at which background material would be most relevant 
is at the point at which a visa issues (at least for countries for which a visa is 
required). This suggests reviewing material at an earlier point in time, instead 
of focusing on the border crossing as an opportunity to look more carefully at 
those entering and leaving the United States. Whether or not this is a good idea 
in terms of the effect on U.S. foreign relations, or how U.S. citizens are treated 
in other countries, is a policy question. The decision of who and what to search, 
as applied to non-U.S. persons requires that Congress carefully consider myriad 
competing interests. 
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conclusion  
Many cases challenging the constitutionality of searches of electronic devices 
are beginning to move through the courts.261 In light of the signiﬁcant Fourth 
Amendment issues at stake, this Essay has endeavored to explain the origins and 
evolution of the border search exception, which is justiﬁed only by its narrow 
purpose: the interdiction of contraband and the regulation of noncitizens 
entering the United States. In the process, it has argued that the nature of 
digitized searches differs in important respects from physical ones. Thus, while 
the transportation of digital contraband is still illegal, if the border search 
exception applies to electronic devices, the government’s use of it may be so 
broad as to render the Fourth Amendment obsolete. There is a reason that, in 
the past, the government was limited by geography and time, by the manner of 
transportation, the size of the item being inspected, the agency allowed to 
conduct the inspection, and the crimes for which they could interdict persons or 
materials. There are currently few, if any, equivalent border restrictions for 
digital contraband. Yet numerous alternative statutory instruments would allow 
for the interdiction of such materials. 
As a matter of immigration law, as soon as a traveler establishes her identity 
as a U.S. citizen, the government must have probable cause, supported by a 
sufficiently particularized warrant, to search her electronic devices. Non-U.S. 
citizens lacking a substantial connection to the country are in a different 
constitutional category. Here, because of signiﬁcant policy concerns, and 
Congress’s historic authority over immigration, the legislature has an important 
role to play. What is needed now, particularly post-Riley, Jones, and Carpenter, is 
a more careful approach, grounded in reasonable suspicion and probable cause, 
that is cognizant of the signiﬁcant constitutional issues at stake in the inspection 
of travelers’ electronic devices. 
 
 
261. See, e.g., Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging a 
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